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Notes
BRAS v. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION: USING
"ECONOMIC REALITIES" TO ESTABLISH STANDING AND
CHALLENGE "GOAL"-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the adoption of the first federal government affirmative action
program in 1969,1 much debate has surrounded the government's use of
1. See Christopher Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in
Race-ConsciousLaw, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1240 (1994) (discussing origins of affirmative action). In 1969, the Department of Labor under the Nixon Administration
issued a regulation, known as the "Philadelphia Plan," that required contractors
involved in federal construction projects in the City of Philadelphia to meet certain hiring goals for minorities. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit upheld the validity of this plan in ContractorsAssociation v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971). For further discussion of the Philadelphia
Plan, see Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL.L.
REV. 893, 896-98 (1994) (describing Philadelphia Plan as major part of Republican
political strategy to use affirmative action to divide Democratic Party along racial
lines); James E. Jones, Jr., The Origins of Affirmative Action, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
383, 394-402 (detailing development of Philadelphia Plan); Robert P. Schuwerk,
Comment, The PhiladelphiaPlan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U.
CHI. L. REv. 723, 742 nn.104-06 (1972) (listing hiring goals of Philadelphia Plan).
The phrase "affirmative action" first appeared in 1962 in an executive order
issued by the Kennedy administration that directed contractors to act affirmatively
to prevent discrimination in hiring and employment. Jones, supra, at 395-96; Don
Munro, Note, The ContinuingEvolution of Affirmative Action Under Title VII: New Directions After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81 VA. L. REV. 565, 565 n.1 (1995) (citing
Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450 (1959-63)). Yet, attempts to define the
phrase precisely have been and continue to be problematic. See STEVEN YATES,
CML WRONGS: WHAT WENT WRONG WITH AFFIRMATIVE AcTION

2 (1994) (noting

that definition of "affirmative action" involves "a semantic wonderland" and that
phrase means "whatever politicians, federal judges, compliance officers, and other
bureaucrats want [it] to mean"). One proponent of affirmative action defined it as
"policies that provide preferences based explicitly on membership in a designated
group." Randall Kennedy, Persuasionand Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative ActionDebat 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327 n.1 (1986). An opponent of racial affirmative action described it as "policy that recognizes proportional entitlements for

racial and ethnic groups."

ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION at vii

(1992). For the purposes of this Note, "affirmative action" refers to a race-conscious system developed to promote greater minority participation.
The two main forms of affirmative action are quotas, or "set-asides," and "preferential treatment" measures. Samuel L. Starks, UnderstandingGovernment Affirmative Action and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 1991 DUKE L.J. 933, 940-41.
Quotas are practices that exclusively reserve certain opportunities or benefits for
members of an identified minority group. Id. "Preferential treatment" is a less
rigid measure that considers a person's minority status as one positive factor
among others when opportunities or benefits are allocated. Id.

(1445)
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race-conscious programs to promote greater minority participation in the
workforce. 2 Proponents of affirmative action contend that it is both necessary to remedy past and present harms against minorities and useful to
encourage racial diversity.3 On the other hand, critics of affirmative ac2. See Farber, supra note 1, at 893 (stating that "[t]he academic debate over
affirmative action has become a bitter stalemate"); Munro, supra note 1, at 565
(comparing affirmative action to other "inherently divisive" issues such as abortion
and homosexual rights); Anger and Elation at Ruling on Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1987, at 1 (summarizing various disputed views on affirmative action). One commentator has suggested that the controversy over affirmative action is linked to its inherent ambiguity. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-72, at 28 (1990). Graham states that from its inception, affirmative action has been problematic because
it exists to guarantee that persons are treated without regard to race, yet it also
creates a "command to act affirmatively" with race as a factor in the process. Id.; see
also Steven V. Roberts, Affirmative Action on the Edge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
13, 1995, at 32 (noting intense debate over affirmative action and arguing that it is
linked to conflict between principles of equal opportunity and merit). For an extensive discussion of the social and legal issues in the affirmative action debate, see
RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONTROVERSY (Russell Nieli ed., 1991) (collecting articles, written by legal scholars and 10
former and current U.S. Supreme Court Justices, addressing most important features of affirmative action debate) and infra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
3. See GERTRUDE EzoRsKY, RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE AcTION 1 (1991) (arguing that affirmative action programs are proper because
blacks, as descendants of slaves and subjects of institutionalized racism, are particularly entitled to "special efforts to ensure their fair share of employment benefits");
JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, DISCRIMINATION AMERICAN STYLE: INSTI-

at xi (2d ed. 1986) (contending that recent notions
of "merit" and "individual opportunity" and concerns over treatment of white
males represent "neglect ... of the serious patterns of discrimination still afflicting
minorities"); MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 2-3 (1991) (stating that supporters of affirmative
TUTIONAL RACISM AND SEXISM

action programs believe that equal treatment, standing alone, can be used to maintain status quo of inequality); MELVIN I.

UROFSKY, A CONFLICT OF RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29 (1991) (stating that many advocates

of affirmative action believe that "[i]f, in the past, the majority used a person's race
or gender or national origin against him or her in a discriminatory manner, it is
now fair to take those same considerations into account, and use them to the person's benefit"); Benjamin L. Hooks, Affirmative Action: A Needed Remedy, 21 GA. L.
REv. 1043, 1052-53 (1987) (arguing that affirmative action is necessary because
race-neutral, remedial measures "ignore the lingering effects of past discrimination" and thus become discriminatory themselves); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending
the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1043, 1043 (proposing that affirmative action is required to end "the manipulation of the concept of 'merit' in our society to maintain the favored position of
the dominant group (white males) in our society"); McGeorge Bundy, The Issue
Before the Court: Who Gets Ahead in America, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1977, at 44-45 (suggesting that "because it is not yet 'racially neutral' to be black in America, a racially
neutral standard will not lead to equal opportunity for blacks"); Charles Krauthammer, In Defense of Quotas, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 16, 1985, at 10-11 (making argument
that "[w]hile color blindness may be a value, remedying centuries of discrimination through (temporary) race consciousness is a higher value"); R. Roosevelt
Thomas, Jr., From Affirmative Action to Affirming Diversity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.Apr., 1990, at 107, 117 (arguing that affirmative action, despite its limitations, has

helped to make goal of workforce diversity attainable).
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tion argue that a policy of race-consciousness, albeit benign, defeats the
principle of equality and only promotes further discrimination. 4 IncreasLikewise, certain members of the United States Supreme Court have endorsed
or encouraged the position that affirmative action is necessary. See, e.g.,Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 & n.6 (1987) (quoting United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)) (reaffirming position that race may be taken
into account in order to "break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy"); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (recognizing
that "the attainment of a diverse student body .... clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal"); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race . . . . [a]nd in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently.").
4. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975) (claiming
that affirmative action in form of racial quotas "is a divider of society, a creator of
castes, and [ ] is all the worse for its racial base, especially in a society desperately
striving for an equality that will make race irrelevant"); KuLL,supra note 1, at 18290 (stating that once political coalition that had succeeded in passing Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 rejected color-blindness and accepted
race-conscious policies, it lost "unifying power and moral claim" of "antidiscrimination principle"); ROSENFELD, supra note 3, at 2-3 (indicating that some opponents
of affirmative action view preferences for women and minorities as equally improper as preferences for white men); THOMAS SOWELL, CIViL RIGHTS: RHETORIC
OR REALrrv? 52-53 (1984) (arguing that affirmative action has become counterproductive); William Bradford Reynolds, An Equal Opportunity Scorecard, 21 GA. L.
REv. 1007, 1007 (1987) (stating that affirmative action is "sugar-coated phrase"
allowing courts to justify discrimination, just as courts were able to stray from principle of equality under law with Jim Crow laws and World War II internment of
Japanese Americans); Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond
Racism, We Must Take into Account of Race," 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 152 (taking
position that affirmative action and notions of restorative justice that led to its
adoption are highly unfair to "many white ethnic groups that came to this country
in great numbers relatively late in its history... who took no part in, and derived
no profit from, the . . .suppression of the currently acknowledged minority
groups, but were . . . themselves the object of discrimination"); Sidney Hook,
Foreward to BARRY R.GROSS, DISCIMINATION IN REVERSE: Is TURNABOUT FAIR PLAY?
at ix (1978) (insisting that "[o]nce we strive to undo the consequences of past
privileges by enstating new privileges in the present, we establish the precedent for
... a permanently polarized society"); William Beer, Resolute Ignorance: Social
Science and Affirmative Action, SOCIETY, May-June 1987, at 63 (stating that "affirmative action has been translated into a series of quotas . . .that benefit certain
groups at the cost of others").
As with the contrary position, the argument that affirmative action promotes
further discrimination has garnered the support of various Justices of the United
States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(rejecting argument that benign racial classifications should be subject to less demanding judicial review because such classifications reflect "paternalism" and "undermine the moral basis of the equal protection principle"); City of Richmond v.
JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The difficulty
of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as nothing compared with the
difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects, which is the
tendency.., to classify and judge men and women on the basis of... the color of
their skin."); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 526 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (indicating that nothing in language of Fourteenth Amendment "singles out
some 'persons' for more 'equal' treatment than others").
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ingly, whites have challenged such race-conscious governmental programs
as a form of "reverse discrimination" in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. 5
In 1989, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 6 the United States
Supreme Court levied a substantial blow to the viability of race-conscious
5. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1767 &
n.262 (1993) (discussing cases in which whites have challenged affirmative action
programs); see also Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (alleging "reverse
discrimination" when white correctional officers failed to receive promotion because Corrections Department determined that black officers were needed to create authority among black inmates); Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1160
(6th Cir. 1994) (alleging "reverse discrimination" against city when white police
officers and fire department employees were denied promotions because of city's
race-conscious promotion program); In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Emp. Lit., 20 F.3d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1994) (charging that City of Birmingham
violated Equal Protection Clause when it made racially-based decisions inpromoting city firefighters), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1695 (1995); Billish v. City of Chicago,
962 F.2d 1269, 1272-73 (7th Cir. 1992) (challenging promotion decisions of Chicago Fire Department, pursuant to affirmative action plan, as violative of Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment); Baker v. Elmwood Distrib., Inc., 940 F.2d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 1991) (alleging that minority
employer fired plaintiffs solely because of their race, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981); United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1257-58 (7th Cir. 1989)
(claiming unlawful discrimination when Chicago police department conducted
promotions based upon test results that were adjusted to favor African-Americans
and Hispanics). The challengers of affirmative action generally acknowledge that
minorities suffered oppression and discrimination in the past. Harris, supra, at
1767 & n.263. They argue, however, that the government violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution when it burdens whites who did
not participate in the past discriminatory acts. Id. The Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1. For a general overview of equal protection doctrine, see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 1436-39 (2d ed. 1988) (stating
that one aspect of equal protection entails "the right to treatment as an equal" by
government).

One commentator has suggested that so-called "reverse discrimination"
should not be addressed in the same manner as discrimination against minorities.
SeeJohn Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L.
REv. 723, 727 (1974). Rather, Professor Ely contends that it is simply not "suspect"
for white males, the majority, to decide to discriminate against themselves in the
form of affirmative action. Id. (claiming that "special scrutiny" is unnecessary
"when White people have decided to favor Black people at the expense of White
people"). Yet, Professor Ely's conclusion may be based upon the uncertain premise that "there is a cohesive white majority having common interests different from
a cohesive coalition of racial minorities." JEROME A. BARRON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 642 (4th ed. Michie 1992).
One Ninth Circuit decision revealed the difficulty in comparing affirmative
action with reverse discrimination. See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319
(9th Cir. 1979). In Legal Aid, the court stated that affirmative action does not
theoretically require preferences or discrimination on the basis of race. Id. at
1343. The court did acknowledge, however, that employers may engage in racially
preferential or discriminatory behavior as a matter of expediency in order to satisfy
affirmative action goals. Id. at 1344.
6. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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programs by mandating that courts apply strict scrutiny to state and local
affirmative action programs. 7 The Croson decision led to renewed efforts
7. Id. at 493-94. For a description of strict scrutiny, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (stating that first prong of strict scrutiny analysis is that law
classifying persons according to race must "be justified by a compelling governmental interest"); Fulidove, 448 U.S. at 480 (providing that second prong of strict
scrutiny examination is whether means employed by government to effectuate its
interest are "narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal"). Prior to Croson
the Court had never definitively subjected affirmative action programs to strict
scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to school
board's policy of laying off nonminority teachers while retaining minority teachers
with less seniority).
In Croson, a nonminority contractor challenged the Richmond's minority business enterprise program after he was denied a waiver of the program's set-aside
requirement. Croson, 488 U.S. at 483. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor
reasoned that a strict standard of equal protection review applies regardless of
whether the race that is burdened by the race-conscious classification is a nonminority race. Id. at 493-94 (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) (holding that absent strict scrutiny,
Court cannot discern which racial classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and
which "are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple
racial politics"). Applying strict scrutiny to the city's affirmative action set-aside
program, the Court required that the city provide a "factual predicate" to support
its adoption of a race-conscious program. Id. at 498. Because the Court found that
Richmond's evidence of past discrimination against minorities in the city's construction industry was insufficient, it declared the set-aside program invalid. Id. at
498-506. In doing so, the Court held that Richmond's conclusory statements of
past discrimination in the construction industry were inadequate. Id. at 499
("[A]n amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a particular
industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota."). In particular, absent statistical evidence of disparity between available minority contractors and minority participation in contracting associations, Justice O'Connor refused to make
an inference of discrimination solely upon the low percentage of public contracts
awarded to minority businesses. Id. at 501, 503. On this basis, the Court concluded that the city had not identified a compelling interest for its racial classifications and struck down the city's set-aside program. Id. at 511 ("Because the city of
Richmond has failed to identify the need for remedial action in the awarding of its
public construction contracts, its treatment of its citizens on a racial basis violates
the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause.").
The dissent in Croson, authored by Justice Marshall, criticized the majority's
decision to apply strict scrutiny to the municipal program as inconsistent with
prior cases and damaging to state and local attempts to eradicate discrimination
through affirmative action measures. Croson, 488 U.S. at 528-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent based this conclusion upon the proposition that remedial
racial classifications such as affirmative action should be subject to a lower level of
judicial review than strict scrutiny. Id. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 301-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517-22 (Marshall, J., concurring); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (joint opinion of Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.)) (contending that remedial race-conscious classifications need only "serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives"). Under this standard, the dissent
would have upheld Richmond's program. Id. at 536 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
dissent added that the Court's decision imposed a "daunting standard" upon state
and local governments that seek to adopt affirmative action programs. Id. at 555
(Marshall, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of the facts of Croson and the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1996], Art. 3
1450

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41: p. 1445

on the part of nonminority individuals to challenge affirmative action.8 As
Justices' opinions, see Janice R. Franke, Richmond v. Croson: The Setting Aside of
Set-Asides?, 34 ST. Louis U. LJ. 603 (1990); Michel Rosenfeld, DecodingRichmond:
Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MICH. L. Ruv.
1729 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1609 (1990); Nina Farber, Comment,
Justifying Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. JA. Croson: The Court Needs a
Standardfor Proving Past Discrimination,56 BROOK. L. REv. 975 (1990).
In 1995, the Court determined that federal affirmative action programs, like
the state and local programs affected by Croson, would also be subject to strict scrutiny. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2113 (stating that racial classifications in local, state
and federal affirmative action programs will be subject to strict scrutiny and overruling Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that "benign"
federal racial classifications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny)).
8. Kenneth Jost, After Adarand, A.BA. J., Sept. 1995, at 70, 74; Robert Pear,
Courts Are UndoingEfforts to Aid Minority Contractors,N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1990, at Al.
At the time of the decision, 36 states and approximately 200 local governments
utilized minority affirmative action programs. Jere W. Morehead & PeterJ. Shedd,
Civil Rights and Affirmative Action: Revolution or Fine-Tuning?, Bus. HORIZONS, Sept.
1, 1990, at 53. Following Croson, the Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense
and Education Fund reported that 31 jurisdictions dismantled their respective affirmative action programs. Jost, supra, at 74. In addition, over 50 court challenges
to municipal affirmative action programs ensued. Id. Indeed, the high threshold
for constitutional validity under Croson suddenly jeopardized many public sector
affirmative action programs. Mary C. Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress's Power to Authorize the States to Implement Race-ConsciousAffirmative Action Plans,
33 B.C. L. REv. 903, 905-06 & n.6 (1992) (citing Stephen Wermiel, Justices Limit
State Contracts Based on Race, WALL ST.J., Jan. 24, 1989, at A3); Rosenfeld, supra
note 7, at 1732; Morehead & Shedd, supra, at 53; Eleanor Holmes Norton & Edward Norton, A Setback for Minority Businesses, LEGAL TIMES, May 1, 1989, at 31.
The Croson Court indicated that the state or local government must make a
substantial showing of prior discrimination in order to satisfy the strict scrutiny
standard of review. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (requiring governments to "identify...
[past] discrimination ... with some specificity before they may use race-conscious
relief"); see also Daly, supra, at 905 (contending that Croson directs state and local
governments to offer proof of past discrimination). Thus, the state or local government effectively faces the burden of proving a prima facie case of prior discrimination in order to uphold its affirmative action program. Kay A. Hoogland &
Condon McGlothlen, City of Richmond v. Croson: A Setback for Minority Set-Aside
Programs, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., June 22, 1989, at 519. Commentators have questioned the ability of governments to meet this heavy burden. See id. (describing
adoption of strict scrutiny as "lethal ...blow to state and municipal set-aside programs"); Lori J. Hoffman, Note, Fatal in Fact: An Analysis of the Application of the
Compelling Governmental Interest Leg of Strict Scrutiny in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 70 B.U. L. REv. 889, 892 (1990) (contending that Croson "renders the
implementation of voluntary affirmative action plans virtually impossible"); cf.Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring) (characterizing strict scrutiny test
as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact"); David G. Savage, Rebuilding Affirmative Action,
A.B.A. J., Aug., 1995, at 42, 46 (concluding that strict scrutiny review is typically
"fatal" for race-conscious programs). For a discussion of attempts by state and local governments to justify affirmative action programs so as to satisfy the mandate
of Croson, see Dorothy J. Gaiter, Racial Reviews, Court Ruling Makes Discrimination
Studies a Hot New Industry, WALL ST.J., Aug. 13, 1993, at Al. For a discussion of the
application of the Croson decision in the lower courts, see Nicole Duncan, Croson
Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 679 (1995).
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a result, the issue of standing has become highly important because it is
the vehicle through which the courts can expand or limit the number of

nonminority plaintiffs who may challenge affirmative action programs. 9
In other words, if standing requirements are relaxed, more nonminority
plaintiffs can bring equal protection claims. 10 Once this occurs, a court
9. Adrian Daunarummo, Recent Case, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 720, 723 & n.8
(1994) (citing George R. LaNoue, Court's Jacksonville Decision Opens Affirmative Action Plans to Increased Litigation,NATION'S CITIEs WKLY., July 12, 1993, at 9 (asserting
that standing issue provided limitation to equal protection challenges of affirmative action)); Leading Cases, 107 HARv. L. REv. 144, 303 (1993) (stating that standing is "one of the issues that has emerged in the ensuing litigation" after Croson);
see also Jost, supra note 8, at 70 (commenting that courts dismissed most equal
protection challenges to minority set-aside programs for lack of standing).
10. In several cases after Croson, standing was a contested issue in equal protection claims brought by nonminority plaintiffs. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097
(granting standing to nonminority subcontractor to challenge federal highway
contracting program that offered prime contractors additional compensation for
meeting minority subcontractor hiring goals); Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the
Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (determining that nonminority plaintiffs had standing to challenge city ordinance implementing minority preference program); Bras v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 59
F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that nonminority plaintiff had standing to challenge minority participation goals of California enactment and agency order), cert
denied, 116 S. Ct. 800 (1996); Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155 (6th Cir.
1994) (denying standing to white police officers and employees of Memphis fire
department who sued city for reverse discrimination); Concrete Works of Colo.,
Inc. v. City of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994) (granting nonminority prime
contractor standing to challenge Denver minority contractor preference ordinance), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City
of Phila., 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993) (granting construction contractors standing to
challenge Philadelphia ordinance that established set-aside program for business
enterprises owned by minorities, women and handicapped persons), affid, 91 F.3d
586 (3d Cir. 1996); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 5 F.3d 1397 (lth Cir.
1993) (remanding issue of whether contractors challenging county program that
treats minority and nonminority contractors differently had standing); Davis v. City
& County of S.F., No. 91-16579, 1993 WL 26842, at *3 (9th Cir. July 15, 1993)
(denying standing to nonminority teachers challenging city affirmative action plan
pursuant to consent decree); Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v.
Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that nonminority contractors had
standing to bring challenge against state statute that mandated compliance with
race-conscious goals); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (determining that nonminority plaintiff had standing to challenge District of Columbia's Minority Contracting Act), Billish v. City of Chicago,
962 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1992) (denying standing to 13 of 20 fighters who challenged Chicago's nonrank-order promotion of minority fire fighters); Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.
1991) (granting organization of construction contractors standing to challenge
San Francisco ordinance that provided bid preference to minority businesses);
Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding standing
for construction company to challenge validity of minority set-aside measures);
Cone Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1991) (denying
standing to challenge state affirmative action program to nonminority contractor
because contractor did not demonstrate loss of any specific contract due to program); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Fulton County, 920 F.2d 752 (lth Cir. 1991)
(holding that nonminority business lacked standing to challenge municipal minority business enterprise resolution, despite loss of business opportunities); Carpen-
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will likely strike down the challenged affirmative action program under
the strict standard of review mandated by Croson.11
This Note examines Bras v. California Public Utilities Commission12 and
the expansion of the doctrine of standing in the specific context of a nonminority plaintiffs equal protection challenge to the California Women
and Minority Business Enterprises Law13 and an order of the California
Public Utilities Commission. 14 Part II of this Note defines the doctrine of
Article III standing under the United States Constitution and discusses the
role of standing analysis in lawsuits involving government affirmative action programs.' 5 Part III of this Note describes the events that led to the
plaintiff's equal protection challenge in Bras.' 6 Parts IV and V then analyze the Bras opinion and conclude that the court correctly reasoned that
ter v. Barnhart, No. 88-3578, 1990 WL 2314, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 1990)
(concluding that nonminority business lacked standing to bring suit against North
Carolina set-aside program that served as prerequisite for receipt of federal high-

way funds); Converse Constr. Co. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 899 F. Supp.
753 (D. Mass. 1995) (determining that business that lost its minority status for

purpose of state and federal set-aside programs had standing to bring equal protection claim); Capeletti Bros., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 776 F. Supp.
1561 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (denying standing to prime contractors who brought equal
protection suit against county for its use of race-conscious programs when granting
county and federally-funded projects); Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v.

Blanchard, 761 F. Supp. 1303 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that association lacked
standing to challenge state set-aside program favoring women and minority owned
business enterprises), affd, 979 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1992); Underground Contractors Ass'n v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist., No. 90-C-3586, 1991 WL
127616 (N.D. Ill.July, 10, 1991) (denying standing to several nonminority plaintiffs
to enjoin set-aside program); Miami Tele-Communications, Inc. v. City of Miami,
743 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that cable television licensees penalized for noncompliance with set-aside program had sufficient injury to confer
standing); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. City of New Haven, 130 F.R.D. 4 (D.
Conn. 1990) (acknowledging that association had standing to challenge municipal

ordinance that set-aside contracts for women and minority-owned firms).
For further discussion of affirmative action challenges after Croson in which
standing was an issue, see Daunarummo, supra note 9, at 724-25 nn.10-11 (listing
cases) and infra note 79 (discussing affirmative action cases that address standing

issue after Supreme Court's standing decision in NortheasternFla. Chapterof the Assodated Gen. Contractorsv. City ofJacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993)).
11. For a discussion of the Croson Court's decision to subject state and local

affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny review, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.

12. 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 800 (1996).
13. CAL. PUB. UT. CODE §§ 8281-8286 (West 1993). For a discussion of the
California Women and Minority Business Enterprises Law, see infra notes 82-83

and accompanying text.
14. General Order 156 of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California (1988). For a discussion of this provision, see infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of general Article III standing doctrine and its particular
significance in recent equal protection challenges against affirmative action pro-

grams, see infra notes 19-79 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the facts of Bras,see infra notes 80-105 and accompany-

ing text.
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the plaintiff had standing1 7 Finally, Part VI argues that the Ninth Circuit's decision follows the less restrictive approach to standing that federal
courts have recently adopted and that the decision will facilitate equal protection challenges brought by nonminority plaintiffs against affirmative action programs in the future.18
II.

BACKGROUND

Standing is a preliminary inquiry in which the federal courts determine "whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits
of the dispute." 19 Standing also relates to the limitation in Article III of
the United States Constitution that allows federal courts to decide only
"cases" or "controversies."2 0 Namely, the Supreme Court has determined
that the standing inquiry exists as "an essential and unchanging part" of
17. For a discussion of the majority and dissenting opinions in Bras and an
analysis of the judges' reasoning, see infra notes 106-63 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the likely implications of the Bras opinion upon Article
III standing doctrine and future challenges to affirmative action programs by nonminority plaintiffs, see infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
19. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). A plaintiff with standing has "a
sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution
of that controversy." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). Justice
Scalia colorfully simplified the concept of a standing inquiry as a court asking a
plaintiff, "What's it to you?" Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential
Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 881, 882 (1983) (arguing

that standing is essential to principle of separation of powers). For a discussion of
the required elements of Article III standing, see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases
...arising

under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States, and.., to

Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies ...
between Citizens of different States; [and] between Citizens of the same State
....");see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992) ("To be
sure, [the Constitution] limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to 'Cases' and
'Controversies.'"); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("Article III of the

Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual 'cases' and 'controversies"'); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (explaining that "cases" or "controversies" requirement is constitutional limit on
ederal courts' jurisdiction) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)); FRast,
392 U.S. at 94 (stating that power of federal courts "is defined and limited" by
"cases" or "controversies" restriction in Article III).
In Fast, the Court provided a rationale for the "cases" or "controversies" requirement. Id. at 94-95. First, it insures that the issues before the court are within
an adversarial context. Id. at 95. Second, the requirement keeps the issues "in a
form capable of resolution through the judicial process." Id. Finally, the Court

added that the requirement helps to reinforce the separation of powers principle
of our government. Id. (stating that limiting federal courts only to "cases" or "controversies" insures that the judiciary will not "intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government").
The F/ast Court described a judicial question that satisfies the "case" or "controversy" requirement as 'Justiciable." Id. at 95-97. Therefore, 'justiciability" measures whether the litigants have presented a question for which they are entitled to
invoke the power of the federal court. C. Douglas Floyd, The JusticiabilityDecisions
of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 862, 862-63 (1985).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1996], Art. 3

1454

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41: p. 1445

confining the federal courts to this constitutional restriction on the exercise of their judicial power.2 1 Accordingly, the Court has determined that
the standing doctrine protects the principles of separation of powers and
federalism inherent in Article 111.22

21. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 656 (1993); Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; see Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 256 (James Madison) (Carey & McClellan
eds., 1990)) (describing standing as one of few "landmarks" that identifies "cases"
or "controversies" that are justiciable under Article III); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498
(stating that standing allows court to answer "the threshold question in every federal case" of whether claimant has "case or controversy" within meaning of Article
III); TRIBE, supra note 5, § 3-14, at 107 (introducing standing as "[t]he doctrine
most central to defining article III's requirement of a 'case' or 'controversy"'). For
a definition of standing, see supra note 19 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the elements of standing analysis, see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying
text.

Despite general agreement as to the doctrine's importance in giving effect to
Article III of the Constitution, an explicit standing analysis emerged in federal
courts only in this century. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
YALE L.J. 221, 224-25 (1988) (claiming that federal courts did not employ general

doctrine of standing to determine whether plaintiff had right to sue until 20th
century); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1374 (1988) (asserting that, for first 150 years of American history, Congress and courts were "oblivious" to concept of standing as

component of "cases" or "controversies" requirement); Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitutional and Prudential
Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1064-65 (1994) (indicating that Court created
standing in response to significant expansion of private rights in this century).
Indeed, the Supreme Court issued its first notable standing decision in 1923 in
Frothinghamv. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Eric B. Schnurer, Note, "More Than an
Intuition, Less Than a Theory". Toward a Coherent Doctrine of Standing, 86 COLUM. L.
REv. 564, 565 & n.6 (1986) ("'The party who invokes the judicial] power must be
able to show ... that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury ... ' (quoting Frothingham,262 U.S. at 447)). Despite its relatively recent appearance, some judges and constitutional scholars insist that standing doctrine is essential to the separation of powers and to federalism. For a
discussion of the role of standing in protecting separation of powers and federalism, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
22. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 662 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 750) (indicating that
standing upholds "cases" or "controversies" requirement of Article III, which "itself
defines.., the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is
founded"); Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (stating that "the law of Article III standing is
built upon a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers"); City of L.A. v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (noting that plaintiff's claim is limited by federalism concerns); see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473-74, 476 (1982) (stating that
Article III analysis ensures that courts remain true to separation of powers principles and federalism); Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 (indicating that courts must not exceed
their "assigned role in our system"); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79 (1976)
(refusing to grant plaintiffs equitable relief because "important considerations of
federalism" weigh against intrusion of federal judiciary into state administration of
its own law (citing Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951))); Warth, 422 U.S.
at 498 (declaring that standing inquiry considers "constitutional limitations on fed-

eral courtjurisdiction"); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 222 (1974) (cautioning against expansion of standing so as to "distort the role
of theJudiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature"); O'Shea v.
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Current Standing Analysis

A plaintiff seeking relief from a federal court must demonstrate the
existence of three elements to establish Article III standing.23 First, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that an injury in fact occurred. 24 Second, the
plaintiff must show that a causal relationship exists between the injury and
the conduct of which the plaintiff complains. 25 Third, the plaintiff is reLittleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-502 (holding that federalism concerns prevent courts
from intruding upon state court proceedings), vacated sub nom., Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974); Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 13 F,3d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir.) (recognizing "the express separation-of-powers concerns" of Lujan Court's standing analysis (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1991))), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 84 (1994). But see Allen, 468 U.S.
at 791 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that" 'whether a particular person
is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation
of powers problems' " (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 100)); Fast, 392 U.S. at 100 (stating that whether plaintiff is proper party to bring suit does not, standing alone,
raise separation of power concerns); TRIBE, supra note 5, § 3-14, at 108 (observing
that Burger Court changed standing inquiry to incorporate separation of powers
concerns); Floyd, supra note 20, at 863 (asserting that Burger Court's reliance
upon separation of powers and federalism concerns conflicts with prior standing
decisions of Warren Court); Gottlieb, supra note 21, at 1072 n.48 (noting authorities that criticize use of standing to link Article III with separation of powers). For
a discussion of the linkage of standing with principles of the separation of powers,
see generally Scalia, supra note 19, at 881 (arguing that standing is essential to
principle of separation of powers).
The Supreme Court has also identified "prudential," as opposed to constitutional, reasons for a court's conclusion that standing is absent. Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 474-75; Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-500; David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Prposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 37, 46-48. The plaintiff cannot
raise a "generalized grievance" that is shared with "a large class of citizens." Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 475; Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. Moreover, the plaintiff's claim cannot rely solely upon "the legal rights or interests of third parties." Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 474; Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. These prudential standing barriers are related
to constitutional concerns, yet they primarily serve as a form of 'judicial self-governance." Id. at 500; see also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (stating that close relationship exists between prudential limitations and Article III). Accordingly, the Court
has held that a plaintiff who has satisfied the elements of constitutional standing
analysis may still be denied standing due to these prudential limitations. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (indicating that
prudential concerns are employed "to avoid deciding questions ... where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim"). But see Scalia, supra note 19, at
886 (contending that prudential standing barriers have fallen into disfavor with
federal courts). For a further discussion of the prudential limitations on standing,
see Logan, supra, at 46-48.
23. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 663. The Supreme Court has stated that these
three elements are the "irreducible minimum" for standing, as required by the
Constitution. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
24. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 663; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 10102; Gladstone,441 U.S. at 100; Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; O'Shea,414 U.S. at 494. For a
discussion of the "injury in fact" element of Article III standing analysis, see infra
notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
25. Northeastern,508 U.S. at 663 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42); Allen, 468
U.S. at 751; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
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quired to establish that the injury may be redressableby a favorable decision of
26

the court.

1. Injuy in Fact
The modern "injury in fact" element of Article III standing originated
in the United States Supreme Court as an expansion of standing doctrine
in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.27 In

Warth v. Seldin,28 however, the Court established the more restrictive reU.S. 252, 261 (1977); Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42. For a discussion of the causation
element of standing analysis, see infra notes 36-42, 47-50 and accompanying text.
26. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 663-64; Allen, 468 U.S. at 752; Simon, 426 U.S. at
38, 41; Warth, 422 U.S. at 508. For a discussion of the redressability element of
standing, see infra notes 36-39, 43-46, 48-49, 51 and accompanying text.
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In Data Processing,an association of data processors
attempted to challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of Currency that allowed competing national banks to make data processing services available to both other
banks and their customers. Id. at 151. The plaintiff association alleged that the
Comptroller's ruling authorized illegal competition. Id. at 152.
In performing its standing analysis, the Court focused its inquiry upon
whether the plaintiff had alleged that the challenged action caused it "injury in
fact, economic or otherwise." Id. The Court found that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an "injury in fact" through its assertion that the Comptroller's ruling authorized illegal competition. Id. Thus, the Court held that the association
had standing to sue the Comptroller. Id. at 158.
The Data Processingdecision is significant because it represented a liberalization of the standing doctrine, thus allowing more individuals to invoke federal
jurisdiction. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1973) (citing Data
Processingas one of "[r] ecent decisions by this Court" that "have greatly expanded
the types of 'personal stake (s)' which are capable of conferring standing"); Data
Processing,397 U.S. at 153 (rejecting accepted "legal interest" test of Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) and replacing it with requirement that

plaintiff only suffer injury in fact "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question"); see also
Kenneth E.Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 645, 645-46 & n.2 (1973) (citing DataProcessing,397 U.S. 150 (1970)) (criticizing general approval of "trend toward easing standing requirements"); Cass R.
Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof PublicLaw, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1445
& n.56 (1988) (arguing that Data Processingwas response to Court's desire to expand judicial review of administrative action by creating "quite lenient" requirement and indicating that Supreme Court has never denied standing under Data
Processing test). Indeed, the language of the decision is indicative of the liberal
approach to standing that the Court wished to achieve. See Data Processing,397 U.S.
at 154 (noting that "the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who
may protest administrative action"). Furthermore, the Court found that the "injury in fact" analysis of standing could be used to challenge governmental actions
that harm not only economic interests, but also less conventional aesthetic, conservational or recreational ones. Id.; see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing
Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L. REv. 185, 187 &
nn.11-15 (1980-81) (citing various cases subsequent to DataProcessingin which "injury in fact" test "was quickly interpreted to encompass a wide variety of grievances"). For a discussion of cases in which the Burger Court later used the "injury
in fact" element, together with the causation and redressability elements, to restrict judicial grants of standing, see supra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
28. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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quirement where a plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action
must demonstrate a "distinct and palpable injury to himself."'2 9 In Warth,
several litigants sued a town in New York, claiming that its zoning ordinance effectively excluded individuals of low or moderate income from
residing in the town. 30 The Court denied standing because the plaintiffs
never demonstrated that the ordinance prevented them from obtaining a
31
specific building permit or performing a construction project.
Therefore, the Court found that the plaintiffs "failed to show the existence
of any injury . . . of sufficient immediacy . . . to warrant judicial
32
intervention.1
Following Warth, the Court further defined "injury in fact" and continued to employ a restrictive standing analysis. 33 The Court found that
an allegedly unconstitutional statute will not suffice for injury unless the
government's enforcement of that statute actually harms the plaintiff in a
direct or particular manner.3 4 Moreover, the Court determined that a
29. Id. at 501 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)); see George
P. Choundas, Comment, Neither Equal Nor Protected: The Invisible Law of Equal Protection, the Legal Invisibility of Its Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY L.J. 1069, 1132 (1995)
(citing Warth as prime example of Court's "rigid application of the standing
requirements").
30. Warth, 422 U.S. at 493. The plaintiffs alleged that the zoning ordinance
prevented the building of low and moderate-cost housing in the town so as to
exclude minorities who typically live in such housing. Id at 496.
31. Id. at 516. The Court stressed that the plaintiffs failed to aver that any one
of them had even applied to the town for a building permit. Id. Because this had
not transpired, the Court found it impossible to infer that the ordinance hindered
any current building project of the plaintiffs. Id.
32. Id. The Court's requirement in Warth that the plaintiffs identify the actual
denial of a permit or building project so as to show that they suffered an injury has
been criticized as unsupported by precedent. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 3-18, at 134
(criticizing stringent injury requirement employed in Warth); Daunarummo, supra
note 9, at734-35 n.52 (supporting proposition that prior to Warth, Supreme Court
never required plaintiffs to demonstrate actual loss of project or property for
standing (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208, 211
(1972);James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 139 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385, 387, 393 (1969); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384-85
(1926))).
33. See Schnurer, supra note 21, at 567 (contending that Court initially relied
upon "injury in fact" element of standing "as a tool for excluding cases from
court").
34. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982). In Valley Forge, an organization supporting the separation of church and state used the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment to challenge the federal government's conveyance of 77
acres of "surplus" military property to a religiously affiliated college. Id. at 467-69.
In its discussion of the standing issue, the Court stated that the "injury in fact"
requirement keeps federal courts from becoming "publicly funded forums for the
ventilation of public grievances." Id. at 473. Accordingly, the Court emphasized
that standing cannot be predicated upon a citizen's general assertion that the government has acted unconstitutionally. Id. at 482-83 (citing Fairchild v. Hughes,
258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922)). Therefore, when the Court found that the organization, despite its fervent desire to maintain the separation of church and state, was
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plaintiff seeking to enjoin allegedly illegal governmental conduct must
show that an injury is imminently pending rather than "conjectural" or
35
"hypothetical.
2.

Causation and Redressability

Soon after its creation of the modem "injury in fact" test, the Court
jointly introduced the two elements of causation and redressability to
standing analysis.3 6 The Court relied upon these elements to deny standnot adversely affected by the property conveyance any more than other citizens, it
concluded that an "injury in fact" for standing was absent. Id. at 485-86 ("Although
respondents claim that the Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else.
They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the
alleged constitutional error .. ");see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 n.13 (1974) (stating that governmental nonobservance
of Constitution will not suffice as injury for standing purposes).
35. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983). In Lyons, the plaintiff
suffered physical injury when members of the Los Angeles police department administered a chokehold upon him. Id. at 97-98. As a result, the plaintiff sought
damages and an injunction to prevent the police from using such chokeholds in
the future. Id. at 98. Although the Court acknowledged that the plaintiff had
standing to seek damages, it found that his assertion of past illegal police conduct
did not establish an imminent injury for standing to enjoin the police. Id. at 10203 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)). The Court added that
if the plaintiff had demonstrated that the city authorized the illegal conduct and
would continue to do so, he would have standing to seek the injunction. Id. at 106;
see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1976) (holding that plaintiffs who
alleged widespread unconstitutional police conduct lacked injury for standing to
gain injunction because claim rested upon what police might do in future).
36. See Kevin A. Coyle, Standing of Third Parties to Challenge Administrative
Agency Decisions, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1078-81 (1988) (citing Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614 (1973)) (indicating that Supreme Court established "traceability" and
"redressability" requirements of standing by following decisions of 1970s); Nichol,
supra note 27, at 188 (suggesting that Court's causation and redressability decisions of 1970s were "an attempt to curb the expansion of standing under the injury-in-fact test"). The two requirements were first applied in standing analysis in
Linda PS. Coyle, supra, at 1079-80; Nichol, supra note 27, at 188. In Linda KS., a
single mother of an illegitimate child brought an equal protection challenge to a
Texas statute. 410 U.S. at 615-16. The statute subjected only fathers of legitimate
children to prosecution for failure to provide child support. Id. In denying standing to the mother, the Court stated that "in the unique context of a challenge to a
criminal statute," the existence of an "injury in fact" alone is not sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 617-18. The Court then found two substantial deficiencies with
the mother's claim. Id. at 618. Specifically, the Court found that the mother could
not demonstrate that her injury, a lack of child support, directly resulted from the
statute's failure to criminalize the father's behavior. Id. Similarly, the Court added
that it was "only speculative" that prosecution of the father would result in the
payment of child support. Id.
Later, the Court adopted the Linda PS. approach and applied causation and
redressability as necessary elements of standing analysis in Warth v. Seldin. See
Nichol, supra note 27, at 189 (arguing that Warth used narrow holding in Linda
K.S. to create general causation and redressability elements for standing). In
Warth, several plaintiffs sued a town, claiming that its zoning ordinance prevented
persons of low or moderate income from living there. Warth, 422 U.S. at 495. In
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ing in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization37 and Allen v.

Wright.38 In Simon, indigent plaintiffs claimed that an Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) ruling was illegal because it provided favorable tax treatment
to certain hospitals that refused to fully serve indigents. 39 Writing for the
Court, Justice Powell noted that the plaintiffs' injury might have resulted
from decisions made by the hospitals that were independent from the effect of the IRS ruling.40 From this observation, Justice Powell stated that it
is only "speculative" to decide that the ruling was the cause of the hospitals' denial of full services to the plaintiffs.4 1 Therefore, Justice Powell
determined that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite element of causation
because the injury could not be "fairly traced" to the challenged governmental action and may have resulted from "the independent action of
'42
some third party not before the Court.
The Simon Court also used redressability analysis to find an absence of
standing. 4 3 The Court stated that the plaintiffs had the burden of showing
that a court ruling in their favor would result in the relief that they dedenying standing, the Court relied upon the causation and redressability elements
of Linda RS. Id. at 504 (citing Linda RS., 410 U.S. at 614). In particular, the
Court required that the plaintiffs show that the zoning ordinance caused their
alleged inability to obtain housing in the town. Id. at 504-05. Furthermore, the
Court said that it was also necessary that the plaintiffs demonstrate that if a court

issued a favorable ruling, the plaintiffs' inability to obtain housing would end. Id.
at 504. When the Court found that the plaintiffs' complaint lacked such allegations, it denied standing to the plaintiffs. Id. at 508-09. In the process, the Court
dismissed the plaintiffs' specific contention that the zoning ordinance precluded
third parties from constructing housing for them. Id. at 504-05. For a discussion
of Warth and the "injury in fact" element of standing analysis, see supra notes 28-33

and accompanying text.
37. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). For a discussion of the Court's standing analysis in
Simon, see infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.

38. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). For a discussion of the Court's standing analysis in
Allen, see infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
39. Simon, 426 U.S. at 33. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged IRS Revenue
Ruling 69-545. Simon, 426 U.S. at 32. The Ruling modified previous IRS policy by
allowing certain hospitals to limit nonemergency services for indigents while still
maintaining their charitable status for advantageous tax treatment. Id. at 31 (citing IRS Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117). Prior IRS policy mandated that, in
order to be considered "charitable" by the IRS, an organization must be "operated
to the extent of its financial ability" for the benefit of indigents. Id. at 30 (citing
Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202).
40. Simon, 426 U.S. at 43-44 (reasoning that denial of hospital services to
plaintiffs could equally "result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard

to the tax implications").
41. Id. at 42-43. Justice Powell stated that the only allegation the plaintiffs
made in their complaint that linked the IRS ruling with their injury was that the
ruling "encouraged" the hospitals to deny the plaintiffs services. Id. at 42.
42. Id. at 41-42. The Court implied that this third party was one of the hospitals that denied full services to the indigent plaintiffs. Id. at 43.
43. Id. at 43-44.
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sired-full services at the hospitals. 44 The Court found that it was very
possible that the hospitals would continue to make their services unavailable to indigents, regardless of a court ruling that the hospitals must receive
unfavorable tax treatment. 45 As a result, the Court held that the redressability element of standing was lacking because there was not a "substantial likelihood" that a favorable court decision would redress the plaintiffs'
46
injury.
Allen v. Wright47 reflects another situation in which the Court relied
upon both causation and redressability inquiries to deny standing. 48 The
plaintiffs in Allen were black parents who alleged that the failure of the IRS
to deny tax-exempt status to certain racially discriminatory, private schools
interfered with their children's right to receive an education in a desegregated school. 49 In refusing to grant standing to the plaintiffs, the Court
held that "links in the chain of causation" between IRS grants of tax exemption and the children's inability to receive an education in a racially
integrated school were "far too weak." 50 Likewise, the Court determined
,44. Id. at 42. The Court adopted this requirement from the strict mandate in
Warth that the plaintiff must actually show that "'prospective relief will effectively
remove the harm."' Id. at 45 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975)).
45. Id. at 43. The Court stressed that dependency upon advantageous tax
treatment could vary substantially among the hospitals in question. Id. Therefore,
the Court concluded that even if it rendered a favorable decision for the plaintiffs,
it was equally likely that the hospitals would decide to avoid the "financial drain" of
providing full services for indigents and would choose to forego the tax benefits.
Id.
46. Id. at 45-46. The Court determined that granting the plaintiffs relief
would merely "discourage" the hospitals from denying services to the plaintiffs. Id.
at 42. Such a result was not sufficient enough to conclude that the plaintiffs' injury
was, in fact, redressable. Id.
47. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
48. Id. at 756-61.
49. Id. at 739-40. The plaintiffs challenged particular guidelines and procedures that the IRS had established for determining whether a private school is
racially nondiscriminatory. Id. at 740-43. Among other things, the guidelines required that private schools adopt of a written, public, nondiscriminatory policy;
give a racial breakdown of the student body, faculty and staff; and identify any
school founders or supporters who wish to maintain segregated private education.
Id. at 741-42 (citing Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587). If a certain private school
refused to comply with these guidelines, the IRS would deny tax exempt status to
the school. Id. at 740 (citing Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587). The plaintiffs,
however, asserted that many racially segregated private schools continued to maintain their tax exempt status despite these guidelines. Id. at 744-45 (indicating that
plaintiffs insisted that segregated schools remained tax exempt under these guidelines simply by "adopting," rather than "implementing," nondiscriminatory policy). Based upon this allegation, the plaintiffs claimed that the IRS's continued
grant of tax exemption to the segregated schools was illegal and unconstitutional.
Id. at 745 & n.12.
50. Id. at 759. The Court stated that this case presented an "even weaker"
chain of causation than that presented in Simon. Id. In its causation analysis, the
Court particularly focused upon the many possible third parties not before the
Court who were likely to have more of a causal connection to the plaintiffs' children's injury. Id. (naming "officials of racially discriminatory schools receiving tax
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under a redressability analysis that it was "entirely speculative" whether the
requested relief, elimination of the schools' tax-exempt status, would
cause the schools to discontinue their discriminatory policies. 51
B.

Relaxation of the "Injury in Fact" Element in Constitutional Challenges to
Affirmative Action

1.

Ninth Circuit Precedent

Despite the mandate of Warth, in Coral Construction Co. v. King
County,52 the Ninth Circuit granted standing to a nonminority-owned construction company who brought an equal protection challenge against an
affirmative action program without requiring that the company identify a
specific project or contract that was lost due to the program. 5 3 In Coral
Construction,a municipal ordinance in a Washington county provided "setaside" contracts and bidding preferences to women and minority owned
businesses. 54 When a nonminority-owned construction company was denied a particular county contract despite being the lowest bidder, the company brought an equal protection challenge against the application of the
county ordinance. 55 Holding that the company had standing, the Ninth
Circuit stated that the company had suffered an "injury in fact" every time
56
it placed a bid and was denied the ability to compete equally.
exemptions and the parents of children attending such schools"). Furthermore,
the Court justified its causation decision by reasoning that granting standing in
this suit would encourage other individuals to challenge agency decisions in federal court, rather than specific governmental violations of the law. Id. The Court
indicated that such challenges "are rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication." Id. at 760.
51. Id. at 758. The Court added that it was also speculative whether the
schools would actually become more integrated once they were threatened with a
loss of their tax exemption. Id.
52. 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991).
53. Id. at 930. For a discussion of the Warth Court's holding, see supranote 31
and accompanying text.
54. Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 914 (citing King County, Wash., Ordinance 8937
(May 1, 1989)). The affirmative action program employed two primary methods.
Id. One method, used with bids for county contracts of $10,000 or less, gave women and minority-owned businesses a preference if their bid was within five percent of the lowest bid. Id. (citing KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 4.18.060 (A) (1)
(1989)). Before the Ninth Circuit heard the case, the five percent preference
method was eliminated and replaced with a "flexible-percent preference" method
that was determined on a "case-by-case" basis. Id. at 915. The second method,
applicable to county contracts exceeding $10,000, required contractors who succeeded in obtaining the county project to use women and minority-owned businesses for a specified percentage of the work performed. Id. at 914 (citing KING
COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 4.18.060(A)(2) (1989)).

55. Id. at 914-15. The contract was awarded to a minority-owned business instead. Id. at 914. The district court upheld the ordinance under strict scrutiny
review. Id. at 915 (citing Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 729 F. Supp. 734 (W.D.
Wash. 1989)).
56. Id. at 930 ("[A]n injury results... every time the company simply places a
bid."). The court was clear that the company could identify a lost bid for the pur-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1996], Art. 3

1462

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41: p. 1445

The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this approach to "injury in fact" analysis
in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Coalitionfor Economic
Equity.57 In Associated General, the plaintiff, an organization of construction contractors, challenged a San Francisco city ordinance that gave bid
preferences for city contracts to minority businesses. 58 The court concluded that the organization had suffered an "injury in fact" sufficient for
standing because of the "mere fact" that the organization's members
could not "play on an even field" with minority businesses. 59
2.

Adoption of the Ninth Circuit'sApproach to "Injury in Fact" by the United
States Supreme Court

In NortheasternRorida Chapterof the Associated General Contractorsv. City
ofJacksonville,60 the Supreme Court confronted the issue of the extent of
injury that a plaintiff challenging an affirmative action program must
61
demonstrate in order to satisfy the "injury in fact" element for standing.
poses of an "injury in fact." Id. (emphasis added). Yet, the court indicated that
because the county program forced the company to participate in an "objectively
unequal bidding process[,]" it was not necessary for the company to actually show
a lost contract in order to have standing. Id. Rather, the court found that an
"injury in fact" arose from the unequal competition that the ordinance created.
Id. (suggesting that company would suffer injury sufficient for standing "even
when it [was] the successful bidder" for contract because company must still undergo "unequal competition" authorized by ordinance).
57. 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 1403-04 (citing Minority/Women/Local Business Utilization Ordinance, No. 139-84 (1984)). The ordinance directed the city to grant up to a 10%
preference to minority-owned businesses during bidding for contracts valued less
than $10,000,000. Id. at 1404-05 (citing S.F. ADMIN. CODE, Ch. 12D (1989)). Associated General Contractors of California, a business organization that was not designated as minority-owned under the ordinance, sued to enjoin the application of
the program, alleging that the preferences violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1405, 1412.
59. Id. at 1407 (citing Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 930); see also Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing inability to compete equally for work due to minority set-aside as cognizable
injury for standing); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420,
423 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 762 F.
Supp. 354, 362 (D.D.C. 1991)) (affirming grant of standing because minority setaside program deprived plaintiffs of "the opportunity to compete on an equal footing" for contracts).
60. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
61. Id. at 658. The Court granted certiorari specifically to resolve the dispute
among the circuits as to what constitutes an "injury in fact" for a viable challenge
to an affirmative action program. Id. at 659-60 (citing O'Donnell, 963 F.2d at 423;
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1992); Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 930). For a
discussion of the lenient approach to "injury in fact" taken by the Ninth Circuit,
see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
The second, more restrictive approach, supported primarily by the Eleventh
Circuit, demanded that the plaintiff actually identify a lost contract as a result of
the challenged affirmative action program. Northeastern, 951 F.2d at 1219; Cone
Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 1991) (requir-
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The plaintiff in Northeasternwas an association of individuals and firms in
the Jacksonville, Florida construction industry. 62 The plaintiff brought an
equal protection challenge to enjoin a Jacksonville ordinance that gave
preferential treatment to minority-owned businesses in the award of city
contracts. 63 The Supreme Court heard the case after the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the association lacked an "injury in fact" for standing. 64 In
particular, the Eleventh Circuit reached this conclusion after the court
found that the association did not demonstrate that one of its members
65
would have obtained a city contract but for the challenged ordinance.
In its review of the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, the Court assessed some
of its previous equal protection standing decisions. 66 Writing for the
ing that contractor seeking to challenge affirmative action program must allege
loss of specific contract to have injury for standing); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v.
Fulton County, 920 F.2d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that loss of opportunity to compete on equal basis without proving loss of contract is insufficient injury
for purposes of standing to challenge set-aside program); see also Contractors Ass'n
v. City of Phila., 945 F.2d 1260, 1264 (3d Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's decision that plaintiffs who identified loss of specific contracts due to city set-aside
program had standing); Carpenter v. Barnhart, No. 88-3578, 1990 WL 2314, at *3
(4th Cir. Jan. 16, 1990) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing because he did not
bid regularly on contracts and never identified any specific contracts lost due to
set-aside program).
62. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 659.
63. Id. The ordinance created a set-aside of 10% of the money spent on city
contracts for "minority business enterprises." Id. at 658 (citing JACKSONVrILLE
PURCHASING CODE §§ 126.604(a), 126.605(a) (1988)). The ordinance defined
such an "enterprise" as a business whose ownership was at least 51% female, black,
Spanish-speaking, Asian, Native American, Eskimo, Aleut or handicapped. Id.
(citing JAcKsoNvI.E PURCHASING CODE § 126.603(a),(b)). Most of the plaintiff's
members did not qualify as "minority business enterprises" under the Jacksonville
ordinance. Id. at 659.
64. Id. at 660 (citing Northeastern, 951 F.2d at 1218). The Eleventh Circuit
vacated the district court's ruling that the ordinance did not pass strict constitutional scrutiny. Id. The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not address the merits of
the association's equal protection argument because it determined that the plaintiff lacked standing. Id.
65. Id. (citing Northeastern, 951 F.2d at 1219); Northeastern, 951 F.2d at 1219
(citing Cone Corp., 921 F.2d at 1205-06) (refusing to grant standing because plaintiff did not allege "that its members would have bid successfully on any one or
more of these contracts if not for the ordinance").
66. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 663-66 (citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957
(1982); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970)); see Clements, 457 U.S.
at 962 (granting plaintiff standing to challenge requirement that directs state officeholders to resign from current office when candidacy for other offices is announced, even though plaintiff did not allege that plaintiff would have been
elected "but for" requirement); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 & n.14 (finding standing
for white medical school applicant to challenge school policy of reserving seats in
class for minority applicants, in absence of allegation that plaintiff would have
been admitted to school but for race-conscious policy); Warth, 422 U.S. at 516 (denying standing to organization challenging town zoning ordinance that effectively
excluded low and moderate income persons because organization did not refer to
any specific project of its members that was precluded by ordinance); Turner,396

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [1996], Art. 3
1464

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 41: p. 1445

Court, Justice Thomas stated that in an equal protection claim, a plaintiff
suffers an "injury in fact" when the challenged government program denies the plaintiff equal treatment. 6 7 Justice Thomas rejected the Eleventh
Circuit's view that an injury in fact exists only when the plaintiff can
demonstrate that he or she was unable to obtain the specific benefit that
was sought. 68 Instead, Justice Thomas adopted the Ninth Circuit's approach and declared that the "injury in fact".from a minority preference
program is "the inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding
process, not the loss of a contract." 69 Applying this rule, Justice Thomas
concluded that because the association had alleged that it was "able and
ready" to bid on public contracts and that the ordinance prevented it from
competing equally with minority-owned businesses for those contracts, the
association had suffered an "injury in fact." 70 In reaching the decision
that the plaintiff had standing, Justice Thomas noted that this definition
of "injury in fact" also incorporated the elements of causation and
71
redressability.
U.S. at 362 n.23 (concluding that plaintiff had standing to challenge law that limited school board membership to property owners, even though plaintiff never
averred that plaintiff would have been appointed to board in absence of
limitation).
67. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 666.
68. Id. Justice Thomas determined that the Eleventh Circuit's "injury in fact"
approach was unfounded because Supreme Court precedent indicated that:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the
barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for
the barrier in order to establish standing. The "injury in fact" in an equal
protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting
from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the
benefit.

Id. (citing Turner,396 U.S. at 362). In reaching this conclusion, Justice Thomas
relied mainly upon Bakke. Id. at 665-66. Justice Thomas noted that, in Bakke, a
white male medical school applicant who was denied admission challenged the
school's admissions program that set-aside positions in the upcoming class for minority applicants only. Id. at 665. Justice Thomas observed that in Bakke, Justice
Powell concluded that the applicant had standing because his "injury" was the inability to compete for all of the positions in the class due to his race. Id. (citing
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281 n.14) (opinion of Powell, J.)). Furthermore, Justice Thomas
concluded from Justice Powell's opinion that the applicant did not have to show
that he would have been admitted "but for" the race-conscious admissions program in order to have standing. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81 (opinion of
Powell, J.)).
69. Id. at 666 (citing City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989)) ("The [set-aside program] denies certain citizens the opportunity to compete
for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race."). For a
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's approach to "injury in fact" analysis, see supra
notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
70. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 666.
71. Id. at 666 n.5. (holding that "[i]t follows from our definition of 'injury in
fact' that [the plaintiff] has sufficiently alleged both that the city's ordinance is the
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Notably, the Northeastern Court distinguished its prior standing decision in Warth v. Seldin.72 In doing so, the Court characterized the "injury
73
in fact" inquiry in much broader terms than it had done in the past.
'cause' of its injury and that a judicial decree directing the city to discontinue its
program would 'redress' the injury").
72. Id. at 666-67 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)). The Warth
Court determined that an association of construction firms lacked an "injury in
fact" because the association did not identify a specific permit or project that the
challenged zoning law prevented them from obtaining. Warth, 422 U.S. at 516. In
Northeastern, the Court held that Warth was not applicable to the case for two reasons. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 667. First, unlike the plaintiff in Northeastern, the
association in Warth did not complain that a discriminatory classification precluded their ability to compete for a project on an equal basis. Id. Rather, the
association in Warth focused upon the local government's refusal to grant it a project that it sought. Id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 515) (stating that association's
complaint in Warth "was not that they could not compete equally; it was that they
did not win"). Second, the Court reasoned that, unlike the plaintiff in Northeastern,
the association in Warth never alleged that any of its members had attempted to
obtain a particular project so as to sustain an injury. Id. (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at
516). Moreover, the Court added that the Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted the
Warth decision because the decision never required that a plaintiff demonstrate that
it would have obtained a benefit "but for" a discriminatory policy. Id. For a further discussion of the standing decision in Warth, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text and supra note 36.
73. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 667 (holding that "injury in fact" for standing to
bring equal protection challenge against minority preference program arises from
inability to compete equally due to government-imposed barrier, not loss of or
inability to obtain specific benefit); see T. Alexander Aleinkoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: DrawingConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L. REv. 588, 642 (1993) (contending that, in contrast to Court's typically
restrictive interpretation, Northeastern greatly eased "injury in fact" requirement);
Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in PrivateMerger Cases: Reconciling PrivateIncentives and PublicEnforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17 n.60 (1995) (citing Northeastern as decision that "illustrate[s] the flexibility of the injury characterization");
NancyJ. King, RacialJurymandering:Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action injury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 707, 743 (1993) (stating that Court
relaxed its standing requirements in Northeastern);Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded
Standing,80 CORNELL L. REv. 1422, 1423, 1437-52 (1995) (calling Northeasterndecision "remarkable" and "a suspicious aberration in the Court's justiciability jurisprudence" in light of past, stringent standing decisions); Cass R. Sunstein, Article II
Revisionism, 92 MIcH. L. Rnv. 131, 132 n.9 (1993) (describing "serious tension"
between Northeastern and prior Supreme Court cases regarding standing (citing

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973))); Daunarummo, supra note 9, at 751, 753-55

n.128 (commenting that Court took more relaxed approach to standing in Northeastern than in prior cases); Leading Cases, supra note 9, at 304, 307-08 (describing
Northeastern as "uncharacteristically 'liberal"' decision in comparison with other
standing jurisprudence); Jost, supra note 8, at 74 (stating that Northeastern"relaxed
standing requirements"); cf Anton Bell, Clarence Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive, 21
N.C. CENT. LJ.194, 210 (1995) (arguing that NortheasternCourt granted standing
without even requiring plaintiff to demonstrate real "injury in fact"). Compare
Northeastern,508 U.S. at 666 (holding that standing of plaintiff arises from imposition of unequal barrier, not ultimate inability to obtain benefit), with Warth, 422
U.S. at 516 (refusing to grant standing because plaintiff never identified any specific benefit precluded by governmental action). But see Choundas, supranote 29,
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Thus, the Northeastern decision departed from the line of prior cases, represented by Warth,74 Simon75 and Allen,76 that consistently placed limitations on standing.
Of equal significance, the Court rendered its standing decision in
Northeastern in the context of a challenge to a government-sponsored affirmative action program. 77 In broadening the definition of "injury in
fact," the Court weakened the typically rigid barrier of standing. 78 Consequently, it greatly expanded the possible number of plaintiffs who may
79
bring constitutional challenges against affirmative action programs.
at 1140-49 (viewing decision in Northeasternas consistent with established exception
to Court's typically rigid standing analysis where plaintiff's "injury in fact" is alleged
denial of equal treatment) (citing Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 656; Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
74. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). For a discussion of the standing decision in Warth,
see supra notes 28-32, 36 and accompanying text.
75. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). For a discussion of the standing decision in Simon, see
supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
76. 486 U.S. 737 (1984). For a discussion of the standing decision in Allen,
see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
77. Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 658. For further discussion of the facts of Northeastern, see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
78. For a discussion of the Northeastern Court's expansion of the "injury in
fact" analysis, see supra notes 69-70, 73.
79. Daunarummo, supra note 9, at 750 & n.127 (citing Tom Provost, Supreme
Court Rulings Have Local Impact, NATION'S CrrTIES WKL.,June 21, 1993, at 2 (arguing
that Northeastern decision makes affirmative action programs vulnerable to suit by
more plaintiffs)); Leading Cases, supra note 9, at 304 (asserting that Northeastern
"furthers judicial access for the opponents of affirmative action"); George R. La
Noue, Court'sJacksonvilleDecision Opens Affirmative Action Plans to IncreasedLitigation,
NATION'S CrriES WKL., July 12, 1993, at 9 (commenting that decision in Northeastern will lead to more litigation); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to
Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 870 (1995) (discussing Northeasternas most recent threat to
"the very viability of affirmative action in any setting"). Some commentators have
suggested that the Court's allegedly remarkable decision in Northeastern can only
be explained as racial politics and racist favoritism of the interests of the white
majority. SeeJerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality
of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masqueradingas Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162,
193-94 & n.135 (1994) (claiming that Northeasterndecision demonstrates that "in a
world where race matters .... this Supreme Court peeks when it decides whose
rights to protect"); Spann, supra note 73, at 1423-24, 1471-72 (examining Justice
Thomas's opinion in Northeastern and concluding that his "disingenuous" attempt
to distinguish Warth illustrates Court's willingness to vary result of standing determinations depending upon race of plaintiff bringing claim). But cf.Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 793 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 666)
(applying "injury in fact" approach of Northeasternto conclude that minority plaintiffs had standing to challenge local and federal residency preferences that allegedly prevented minorities from residing in suburbs).
The effect of Northeastern on standing analysis is apparent in the Tenth Circuit's decision in Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518-19 (10th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1315 (1995). In Concrete Works, a construction
firm sought to enjoin the application of a Denver ordinance that directed prime
contractors to meet certain subcontracting participation "goals" for women, and
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In Bras v. CaliforniaPublic Utilities Commission,8 0 the Ninth Circuit ad-

dressed an equal protection challenge to the provisions of a California
statute that required particular nongovernmental entities to meet certain
minority participation goals. 8' The statute at issue in Bras was the Califorminority-owned businesses. Id. at 1516-17. When the firm failed to comply with
the participation goals, it allegedly lost three construction contracts. Id. at 1517.
As a result, the firm challenged the city ordinance on equal protection grounds.
Id. The district court granted standing to the firm, but the court said that the
firm's injury was "'extraordinarily weak"' because it did not show that it "'was refused a contract because of the race or gender of its owner.'" Id. at 1518 (quoting
Concrete Works, Inc. v. Denver, 823 F. Supp. 821, 827-28 (D. Col. 1993)).
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the firm satisfied its burden
of establishing standing. Id. The court noted that after the district court's decision, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Northeastern. Id. Therefore, the court
concluded that the Supreme Court's decision controlled its "injury in fact" analysis. Id. In light of Northeastern,the Tenth Circuit stated that the firm had shown an
"injury in fact" because the Denver ordinance prevented the firm from competing
equally with women and minority prime contractors for city contracts. Id.; see also
Comer, 37 F.3d at 775 (using Northeasternto reason that African-American plaintiffs
had standing to challenge suburban residency preferences because court found
that preferences were government-imposed barriers that made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to obtain benefit of living in suburbs); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough
County, 5 F.3d 1397, 1399 (lth Cir. 1993) (reversing and remanding, in light of
Northeastern,district court's dismissal of nonminority contractor's suit for lack of
standing).
The Supreme Court most recently applied its expanded "injury in fact" analysis from Northeasternto grant standing to a nonminority subcontractor in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (1995). In Adarand, the nonminority subcontractor challenged a federal contracting program that granted prime
contractors additional compensation if the contractors met an established "goal"
of hiring minority subcontractors. Id. at 2101-02. In its standing inquiry, the Court
rejected the government's argument that, in order to have an injury for standing,
the subcontractor must show that his company has been and will be the lowest
bidder on government contracts. Id. at 2105. Instead, the Court stated that Northeastern stands for the proposition that a plaintiff need only demonstrate an inability
to compete equally due to a discriminatory classification to have an "injury in fact."
Id. (citing Northeastern,508 U.S. at 666). Thus, when the Court reasoned that the
challenged federal program would force the nonminority subcontractor to compete unequally for future federal contracts, it held that the subcontractor had established an "imminent" injury for standing. Id. For further discussion of
Adarand,see Spann, supra note 73, at 1474-75 (arguing that Adarand is consistent
with prior affirmative action cases which show that current Supreme Court favors
interests of whites over those of minorities); Julie A. Ellis, Recent Case, 34 DuQ. L.
Riv. 403 (1996) (discussing facts and opinions of Adarand decision); Jost, supra
note 8, at 70-75 (considering future of federal affirmative action following Adarand
decision); Rhonda McMillion, Affirmative Action Struggle, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 93
(discussing support for Adarand among opponents of affirmative action and reporting that President Clinton stated that some federal affirmative action programs must be altered due to Court's holding).
80. 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 800 (1996).

81. For a discussion of the events leading up to the plaintiffs lawsuit, see infra
notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
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nia Women and Minority Business Enterprise Law of 1986 ("Law").82 The
Law ordered the California Public Utilities Commission ("Commission")
to create "guidelines" to aid the major state utilities in their efforts to develop programs for procuring more products and services from women,
83
minority and disabled veteran business enterprises.
Pursuant to its new duty under the Law, the Commission executed
84
General Order 156 ("Order") in 1988 as a guideline for the utilities.
The Order mandated that each utility establish "goals" in which the utility
would purchase no less than fifteen percent of its products and services
from minority-owned businesses. 85 If the utility failed to make progress
82. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8281-8286 (West 1993). The California Legislature passed the Law after it found that state-regulated public utilities were procuring a disproportionately small share of their products and services from women,
minority and disabled veteran business enterprises. Id. § 8281(b) (1) (C). The Legislature stated that the specific purpose of the Code was to "encourage greater
economic opportunity for women, minority, and disabled veteran business enterrises" and "promote competition among regulated public utility suppliers." Id.
8281(b) (2) (A)-(B).
83. Id. § 8283(c). Specifically, the utilities at which the Law was directed included "all electrical, gas, and telephone corporations with gross annual revenues
exceeding twenty-five million dollars." Id.
The California Legislature categorized and defined women, minority and dis-

abled business enterprises as follows:
(a) "Women business enterprise" means a business enterprise that is at
least 51 percent owned by a woman or women ....
(b) "Minority business enterprise" means a business enterprise that is at
least 51 percent owned by a minority group or groups . . . [and t]he
contracting utility shall presume that minority includes Black Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Pacific Americans.
Id. § 8282(a)-(b). Additionally, the Legislature defined a "disabled veteran business enterprise" as a sole proprietorship with disabled veteran ownership of at least
51% or more. Id. § 8282(c) (citing CAL. ML. & VET. CODE § 9 99 (g) (West Supp.
1995)).
84. General Order 156 of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California § 1.1.1 (1988) ("Order").
85. Id. § 8.2 ("Each utility shall establish initial minimum long-term goals for
each major category of products and services the utility purchases ...of not less
than 15% for minority owned business enterprises."). For clarification, the Order
defined a "goal" as a "target which.., indicates progress in a preferred direction"
and explicitly stated that "a goal is neither a requirement nor a quota." Id.
§ 1.3.13. Utilities were also encouraged to "reach parity" with public agencies that
were granting at least 30% of their contracts to minority business enterprises. Id.

§ 8.3.
For accountability purposes, the Order directed each of the utilities to provide
an annual report on their procurement plan. Id. § 9. In the report, the utility
must describe its procurement efforts and summarize its purchases and contracts
from women or minority businesses. Id. § 9.1.1-.2. In addition, the utility must

explain any reasons for not attaining the minority participation goals. Id. § 9.1.4.
The Order also directed each utility to incorporate certain "minimum program elements" into its procurement program. Id. § 6.1. These elements primarily consisted of training instructions for those utility employees having
procurement responsibilities. Id. § 6.1.1. The instructions also mandate, however,
that these employees "be evaluated on their progress in meeting the goals of their
specific area of procurement." Id.
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toward these goals, the Commission had the ability to issue a sanction
against the utility.8 6
In 1991, the telephone utility Pacific Bell, in accordance with its obligations under the Order, issued a "prequalification criteria" form to various architectural firms.8 7 The utility intended to use the form to gather
information and evaluate those firms from whom the utility would receive
proposals for future architectural work.8 8 In February 1991, J. Jack Bras,
architect and owner of the architectural firm J. Jack Bras & Associates,
completed one of Pacific Bell's forms.8 9 Although Bras's firm had regularly provided architectural services for Pacific Bell in the past, Bras also
90
was required to answer the form's questions.
One of the form's questions asked if the particular firm was certified
as a minority or women business enterprise. 91 Because Bras was a white
male, his firm had not attained this status. 92 Consequently, Bras answered
93
the form's certification question in the negative.
Bras next heard from Pacific Bell in June 1991. 94 At that time, Pacific
Bell informed Bras that his firm was not among the three firms that would
receive its future business proposals. 95 Pacific Bell based its decisions
upon the answers that the various firms had given to the questions on the
86. Id. § 8.12. (stating that "no penalty shall be imposed for failure of any
utility to meet and/or exceed goals" except for "any penalty imposed as a result of
a Commission-initiated investigation"). To penalize a particular utility, the Commission conceded that it could reduce its rate of return. Bras v. California Pub.
Utils. Comm'n, 59 F.3d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 800 (1996).
87. Bras, 59 F.3d at 872.
88. Id.
89. Id.; Appellant's Opening Brief at 11, Bras v. California Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-15764).
90. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871. Indeed, Bras's firm had provided Pacific Bell with
architectural services for 22 years-from 1969 to 1991. Id. From 1983 to 1990, the
Pacific Bell account gave Bras 30% of his gross receipts. Id. Moreover, Bras's most
recent service for Pacific Bell was a three-year contract extending from 1989-91.
Id. Nevertheless, the contract manager of Pacific Bell notified Bras in a letter that
his firm would be "disqualified from participating in [Pacific Bell's] corporate
long-term plans" if Bras did not complete the form. Id.
91. Id. The certification process was performed through the Cordoba Corporation Clearing House. Id. The Order established rules and guidelines for the
eligibility of women business enterprise and minority business enterprises in the
utility procurement program. General Order 156 of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California § 2 (1988). The Order stated that the Commission
will establish a "clearinghouse" to verify and audit those enterprises that are considered a women and/or minority business enterprise. Id. § 3.1.
92. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-12, Bras (No. 93-15764). For the definitions of women and minority business enterprises as provided by the California
Legislature, see supra note 83.
93. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871.
94. Id.
95. Id. Bras learned of this decision after he wrote to the President and CEO
of Pacific Bell and asked why he was suddenly and unexpectedly not receiving any
business from the utility. Appellant's Opening Brief at 12, Bras (No. 93-15764).
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"pre-qualification criteria" form. 96 Pacific Bell told Bras that his negative
response to the form's certification question prevented his firm from being one of the three that Pacific Bell had selected. 9 7 Equally important,
Pacific Bell's Director of Project Management-Real Estate stated that the
impetus behind Pacific Bell's development of the "prequalification criteria" form was the Order and its requirement that utilities set certain goals
for purchasing from women and minority-owned businesses by 1993.98
In response to his exclusion from further business with Pacific Bell,
Bras filed a civil rights action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California against the Commission.9 9 Bras sought a
96. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871. In particular, the answers were used to rank the 13
responding firms according to nine "attributes." Appellant's Opening Brief at 12,
Bras (No. 93-15764). These attributes included quality of firm's past performance,
experience in central office design, experience in administrative space design,
number of licensed architects available, number of years in business, firm expenditures in 1990, size of firm and status of firm as a women or minority business
enterprise. Id. at 13.
97. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871. Pacific Bell told Bras that his firm ranked sixth
among the 13 architectural firms that Pacific Bell considered. Id. The utility also
informed Bras that if his answer to the certification question had been "yes," his
firm would have ranked third in the rankings and would have been invited to develop a long-term working relationship with Pacific Bell. Id. Instead, the utility
told Bras that a minority-owned business that had answered "yes" to the certification question ultimately ranked third. Id.
98. Appellant's Opening Brief at 13, Bras (No. 93-15764) (citing Oct. 1991
letter from Jack Behseresht). The Director stated that the Order "requires Pacific
Bell to set goals for purchasing from [minority business enterprises] of 15% of
total purchasing dollars from minority-owned businesses." Id. The Director then
admitted: 'I.
Jack Bras and Associates has provided valuable services to Pacific Bell
in the past and was not eliminated due to any unsatisfactory performance." Id.
Finally, the Director concluded with a promise that Pacific Bell would maintain
Bras's information file if any "reevaluation of our need for architectural services"
occurs in the future. Id.
99. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871. Bras based his civil rights claims on 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1988). Id. Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State ...to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (a) (1994). The Supreme Court held that § 1981 protects the ability of both
whites and minorities to make and enforce contracts. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 292-93 & n.23 (1976). Section 1983 provides that
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects.., any citizen.., to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .... shall be liable to the
party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This provision provides the injured party with a
remedy for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. MICHAELJ. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DIScRIMiNATION 932 (3d ed. 1994). Section 1985 prohibits two or more persons from
conspiring "for the purpose of depriving.., any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws" and permits the injured party to recover damages
from the conspirators. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether a white male may sue under this provision. See United Bhd. of
Carpenters &Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983) (commenting that "it is a
close question" whether 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) prohibits any class-based animus
other than that directed against African-Americans). The lower courts also have
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permanent injunction to prevent the Commission from further implementing the Law and the Order.100 He alleged that these provisions were
unconstitutional and void as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.10 1 The district court, however, never reached
the merits of the case because it dismissed Bras's claim against the Com102
mission for lack of standing.
Bras appealed the adverse decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.1 03 That court confronted the issue of whether
Bras had established standing to challenge the allegedly discriminatory
measures.10 4 Reversing the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit majority held that Bras met his burden and had standing to seek an injunc10 5
tion against the Commission.
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

A.

The Majority Opinion

In Bras, the Ninth Circuit considered the sole issue of whether Bras
had standing to bring an equal protection claim against the Commission. 10 6 The majority opinion in Bras, authored by Chief Judge Wallace,
began by enumerating the three required elements of Article III standing:

not reached a consensus on the issue. See Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous.
Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 593 (7th Cir.) (allowing white plaintiffs to make allegations of
conspiracy motivated by racial animus against whites under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).
But see Moore ex re. Blakely v. City of Denver, 744 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 (D. Colo.
1990) (rejecting claim by white male under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) because white
males, as class, were not subjected to historically pervasive discrimination or racial
animus).

Besides filing a complaint against the Commission, Bras also sued Pacific Bell
for civil rights violations based upon the utility's selection of architectural firms
using its "prequalification criteria" form. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871. In particular, Bras
alleged that the utility had committed race and sex discrimination against him. Id.
Notably, however, Bras settled all of his claims against Pacific Bell before the case
reached the district court. Id. at 872. For a discussion of the significance that
Judge Pregerson gave Bras's settlement with Pacific Bell in his dissenting opinion
in Bras, see infra note 134 and accompanying text.
100. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871.
101. Id. For the relevant portion of the text of the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, see supra note 5.
102. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871-72 (noting that Bras settled all claims against Pacific
Bell before district court dismissed claim against Commission).
103. Id. at 871.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 875-76.
106. Id. at 878.
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"injury in fact," causation and redressability.10 7 The court then focused its
08
inquiry upon whether Bras had satisfied each requirement.
Addressing the "injury in fact" requirement, the court acknowledged
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Northeasterncontrols
the "injury in fact" analysis for equal protection cases. 10 9 The court stated
that, under this standard, Bras only needed to demonstrate that he was
"able and ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevent[ed him] from doing so on an equal basis."' 10 Applying these rules,
the court determined that Bras had met his burden. 1 In reaching this
conclusion, the court acknowledged that Bras was unable to bid on a Pacific Bell contract at the time.11 2 The court determined, however, that
this inability was because of the long-term nature of Pacific Bell's contracts
and not Bras's unwillingness to provide architectural services.' 13 Instead,
the court found that Bras satisfied the requirements of both Northeastern
and Ninth Circuit precedent by indicating that he wished to "reinstate" his
business relationship with Pacific Bell "in the future" so that he was "ready,
willing and able" to provide services to Pacific Bell, if given the
114
opportunity.
107. Id. at 872 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559
(1992)). For a discussion of the three required elements of standing, see supra
notes 23-26. The court indicated that the plaintiff, Bras, had the burden of establishing each of the three requirements to defeat the Commission's summary judgment motion. Id. To do this, the court stated that Bras, as the nonmoving party,
had to present specific, affirmative evidence establishing each requirement. Id. at
872-73 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Moreover, the
court indicated that because the Commission moved for summary judgment, the
court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to Bras. Id. at 872
(citing First Pac. Bank v. Gilleran, 40 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1994)).
108. Bras, 59 F.3d at 873-75. For a discussion of the Bras court's "injury in
fact" inquiry, see infranotes 109-20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
Bras court's causation and redressability inquiry, see infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
109. Bras, 59 F.3d at 873 (citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen.
Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993)). Indeed, the court indicated that the Northeastern Court actually adopted the Ninth Circuit's "injury in
fact" analysis from the Coral Construction and Associated General cases. Id. (citing
Northeastern,508 U.S. at 666). For a discussion of CoralConstruction, see supranotes
52-56 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Associated General, see supra notes
57-59 and accompanying text.
110. Bras, 59 F.3d at 873 (citing Northeastern,508 U.S. 665-67).
111. Id.

112. Id.
113. Id. The court indicated that the three architects would have a three year
relationship with Pacific Bell. Id. Thus, Bras could not presently bid on a Pacific
Bell contract because this term had not yet expired. Id. The court viewed this
distinction as a mere technicality and stated that Bras's ability to compete "for
long-term contracts every several years rather than on a project-by-project basis
does not change the [injury in fact] analysis." Id.
114. Id. at 874. To reach this conclusion, the court also considered evidence
from the record that Pacific Bell was pleased with Bras's work and told him that it
would keep his information on file for consideration in the future. Id. The court
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The court next considered the requirement in Northeasternthat claimants must identify a discriminatory policy that prevents them from competing for contracts "on an equal basis."' 15 As a preliminary matter, the court
considered the Commission's argument that the Law and the Order are
not discriminatory policies because their provisions only established
"goals" and lacked "discriminatory devices such as preferences or set117
asides." 116 The court, however, dismissed this contention as superficial.
Moreover, the court indicated that the plaintiffs in Northeastern had
demonstrated standing to challenge an ordinance that only established
"participation goals.""18 Finding Northeastern analogous," 9 the court de-

inferred from this evidence that Pacific Bell would allow architects, including Bras,
to compete for its business in the future. Id. Thus, the court decided that the
continued implementation of the Law and the Order would prevent Bras from
competing equally for these future contracts. Id. at 874-75.
115. Id. at 873 (citing Northeastern,508 U.S. at 666). Although the court introduced this requirement in its "injury in fact" analysis, it noted that an inquiry of
whether Bras was unable to compete equally "implicates not only the injury in fact
requirement, but also the interrelated requirements" of causation and redressability. Id. at 874; see Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 666 (noting that Court's "injury in
fact" definition also incorporates elements of causation and redressability).
116. Bras, 59 F.3d at 874. For the language of the Order establishing "goals"
and the Commission's definition of a "goal" in the Order, see supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
117. Bras, 59 F.3d at 874 ("The [Law] and Order are not immunized from
scrutiny because they purport to establish "'goals' rather than 'quotas."').
118. Id. at 874 (citing Northeastern,508 U.S. at 660). In Northeastern,Jacksonville repealed the explicit 10% set-aside it had adopted soon after the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Northeastern,508 U.S. at 661. The city replaced the setaside with women and minority "participation goals" that varied from 5% to 16%.
Id. As the Bras court noted, however, this alteration of the ordinance in Northeastern did not change the Supreme Court's analysis. Bras,59 F.Bd at 874. Instead, the
Supreme Court held that as long as the goal-based ordinance "'accords preferential treatment to black- and female-owned contractors ... it disadvantages [the
plaintiffs] in the same fundamental way"' as the repealed, set-aside ordinance. Id.
(quoting Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 662).
119. Bras, 59 F.3d at 875. The court discussed other decisions that "have also
concluded that the label attached to the program does not change the standing
analysis." Id. (citing Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Concrete Works of Colo. v. Denver, 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1315 (1995); Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50
(2d Cir. 1992)); see Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102 (finding standing to challenge federal program that established "goal" of participation of "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals"); Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1516-18 (concluding that
nonminority contractor had standing to challenge ordinance that created minority
participation "goals"); Harrison, 981 F.2d at 55 (recognizing standing of nonminority contractor to challenge state statute that directed contractors to comply
with "disadvantaged enterprise goals"). The court indicated in each of these cases,
the courts granted the plaintiffs' standing to challenge a government program that
established participation or hiring goals. Bras, 59 F.3d at 875. Thus, the Bras court
concluded that each case "supports the conclusion that a program that establishes
'goals' rather than rigid 'quotas' can still cause 'injury in fact."' Id.
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clared that, rather than "labels," the "economic realities" of a program and
20
their relation to the plaintiff should control the standing analysis.'
In determining that the provisions were discriminatory policies that
prevented Bras from competing on an equal basis, the court also addressed the causation and redressability elements of standing from this
"economic realities" perspective.' 2 1 The court found that the two standing requirements were met because the economic reality of both the Law
and the Order was a requirement that public utilities adopt a discriminatory program or face sanctions. 12 2 Thus, the court concluded that a "sufficient nexus" existed between Bras's injury in fact and the Commission's
enforcement of the Law and implementation of the Order.' 23
B.

Judge Pregerson'sDissent

Dissenting in Bras,Judge Pregerson argued that Bras's claim was too
"hypothetical" for judicial review; therefore, the majority was mistaken in
120. Bras, 59 F.3d at 874 ("We look to the economic realities of the program
rather than the label attached to it."). Although the court did not provide a definition of what "economic realities" entails, the court later stated in its analysis that it
would not limit its evaluation to what the challenged provisions "expressly state[,]"
rather it would determine if the provisions have the "practical effect" of encouraging or compelling the adoption of discriminatory measures. Id. at 875.

121. Id. at 874. For further discussion of the court's "economic realities" ap-

proach to standing, see supra note 120 and infra note 153 and accompanying text.
122. Bras, 59 F.3d at 875 (stating that "[wihile the [Law] and Order do not
expressly state that public utilities must adopt any particular programs such as bidding preferences or set-asides, they clearly have the practical effect of requiring
them to do so"). The court reached this conclusion with conviction. See id. (stating that causation is present because "the [Law] and Order effectively encourage,
if not compel, Pacific Bell to adopt discriminatory programs"). Earlier in the opinion, however, the court intimated that, under Northeastern, a plaintiff need not
show that a law "requires" a discriminatory program. Id. Rather, the court stated
that Northeasternstands for the proposition that a plaintiff need only demonstrate
that the challenged law "authorizes or encourages" discriminatory measures. Id.
In reaching its conclusion, the court specifically found it convincing that the
Commission monitored each California utility and could sanction it for failure to
reach the goals of the Law and the Order. Id. For the relevant provisions of the
Law and Order, see supra notes 82-86. The court also pointed out that utilities had
conducted nondiscriminatory outreach programs in the past to increase the participation of women and minorities. Bras, 59 F.3d at 875. From this, the court decided that "the clear message" sent by the California Legislature and the
Commission in the Law and the Order was that the utilities' previous outreach
programs were inadequate. Id.

123. Bras, 59 F.3d at 875. The court explicitly declared that its holding was

not indicative of the merits of Bras's equal protection claim. Id. at 875-76 ("We
express no opinion as to whether the [Law] or Order discriminates against Bras on
the basis of race or gender. All we hold is that he has standing ....
). On remand, the Commission would have the opportunity to characterize the provisions
as narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (holding that state and local
affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny).
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its grant of standing. 124 First, Judge Pregerson claimed that Northeastern
does not support the majority's conclusion that Bras suffered an "injury in
fact." 12 5 Rather,Judge Pregerson said that Bras's injury was "unreasonably
abstract"'1 6 because Bras could not show that his firm would bid on a "cur12 7
rently proposed" project as the association of firms in Northeasterndid.
Judge Pregerson then asserted that the majority improperly concluded that the Law and the Order created unequal competition based
12 9
upon race.' 2 8 Again, Judge Pregerson distinguished Northeastern.
Namely, because the language of the Law and the Order did not explicitly
require a set-aside program, Judge Pregerson declared that the provisions
do not "foreclose" equal competition so as to constitute "discriminatory
policy."' 30 Moreover, Judge Pregerson stated that the majority could not
124. Bras, 59 F.3d at 876, 879 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) ("We should not exceed our judicial authority by holding that [Bras] has standing.").
125. Id. at 877 (Pregerson,J., dissenting) (citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of
Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993))
("Bras has not shown an injury of 'sufficient immediacy and ripeness to warrant
judicial intervention.').
126. Id. at 877 (Pregerson,J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson also characterized
Bras's alleged injury as neither "'actual [n]or imminent"' to form the basis for
Article III standing. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
127. Id. at 877 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (quoting Northeastern, 508 U.S. at
667). Judge Pregerson noted that the Northeastern Court distinguished the Court's
earlier denial of standing in Warth v. Seldin. Bras, 59 F.3d at 877 (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (citing Northeastern,508 U.S. at 667). Judge Pregerson asserted that the
Northeastern Court reached this conclusion because the Warth plaintiffs could not
establish that they had applied to work on a current project. Id. (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting).
Judge Pregerson then reasoned that Bras's case was more analogous to Warth
than to Northeastern. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Namely, Judge Pregerson determined that Bras lacked an imminent injury in fact because the three-year term
of Pacific Bell's business relationships made it impossible for Bras to allege that he
planned to work on a current Pacific Bell project. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
For similar reasons, Judge Pregerson determined that Bras could not show that he
was "ready" and "able" to bid as Northeastern required. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citing Northeastern,508 U.S. at 666). He argued that Bras's statement that he
was "ready" and "able" to provide Pacific Bell with architectural services was inadequate because Bras could not make this statement in the context of an on-going
bidding process as the plaintiff in Northeastern could. Id. (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting).
128. Id. (Pregerson,J., dissenting) (citing Northeastern,508 U.S. at 666) (arguing that Law and Order do not create barrier "that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another
group").
129. Id. at 877-78 (Pregerson,J., dissenting). For a discussion of the facts and
holding of Northeastern, see supra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
130. Bras, 59 F.3d at 877-78 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson
stated that the program in Northeasternmade set-asides available as an "explicit option which the defendant, the city itself, could employ at any given time." Id. at 878
(Pregerson, J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson then contrasted the provisions at issue in Bras by stating that neither the Law nor the Order expressly created "any
type of set-aside scheme" or granted the Commission the option to employ a set-
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escape the race-neutral language of the provisions by merely arguing that
1 31
the provisions have the "practical effect" of creating race-consciousness.
Lastly, Judge Pregerson contended that the causal connection be132
tween the Commission's actions and Bras's alleged injury was lacking.
Declaring that the Law and the Order only direct Pacific Bell to set hiring
goals, Judge Pregerson took issue with the majority's holding that the pro-

visions "compel" Pacific Bell to adopt a discriminatory program. 133 Moreover, Judge Pregerson concluded that Bras's alleged injury was traceable
134
only to Pacific Bell, a party not before the court as a defendant.
aside program. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. PUB. UTru. CODE
§ 8283(b) (West 1994); General Order 156 of the Public Utilities Commission of
the State of California § 8.2 (1988)). For these reasons, Judge Pregerson determined that the Commission did not "erect a barrier" to equal competition. Id.
(Pregerson, J., dissenting).

131. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he majority cites no evidence to support th[e] conclusion" that Law and Order have "practical effect" of
requiring utilities to adopt minority bidding preferences or set-asides). Because
the Law and the Order did not "specify" or "dictate" how the participation goals
would be met, Judge Pregerson asserted that utilities could freely operate genderor race-neutral programs. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting). As an example, Judge
Pregerson stated that a utility could adopt a nondiscriminatory program helping
all inexperienced architects that could also have the effect of achieving the goals of
the Law and the Order. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Namely, Judge Pregerson
argued that such a program would treat both white and minority inexperienced
architects equally, while serving to increase the participation of minorities in procurement of contracts. Id. (Pregerson,J., dissenting). Because such an option was
feasible under the Law and the Order, Pregerson concluded that the provisions
did not create equal protection problems. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)) (stating that Bras could not prove that his injury was
"fairly ... trace[able] to the ... defendant").
133. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting) ("The provisions do not imply or suggest,
and certainly do not compel utilities to use discriminatory programs."). In addition, Judge Pregerson did not accept the majority's determination that the Law
and the Order sent a "clear message" that the utilities' race- and gender-neutral
outreach programs were inadequate. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting). First, Judge
Pregerson said that the majority reached this conclusion without the support of
any legislative history, case law, affidavits or other evidence. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Second, Judge Pregerson found that it was equally likely that the California Legislature had intended the provisions to encourage the utilities to direct
"their already sufficient efforts toward specific goals." Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson claimed that the majority's conclusion was an attempt to
"gloss over" the issue of causation. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Pregerson,J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson compared the case with
Allen v. Wright. Id. at 879 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 759 (1984)). For a discussion of the Allen decision, see supra notes 47-51
and accompanying text.
Judge Pregerson noted that the Supreme Court in Allen found causation and
redressability to be lacking because the plaintiffs' alleged injury, education in racially segregated schools, was related to the challenged school's grant of tax exemption by the IRS only "by way of intermediary parties, the private discriminatory
schools." Bras, 59 F.3d at 879 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Pregerson said that
Bras's case was similar because Pacific Bell was an intermediary party like the discriminatory schools in Allen. Id. (Pregerson,J., dissenting) ("Bras's future injury, if
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CRITCAL ANALYSIS

In Bras, the Ninth Circuit determined that Mr. Jack Bras had standing
to pursue an equal protection challenge against two California state provisions that created and implemented a "goal"-based minority participation
program.1 3 5 In his dissent, Judge Pregerson argued that the majority's
reasoning was flawed and unfounded. 136 Yet a thoughtful application of
relevant precedent to Bras's case indicates that the majority was correct in
holding that Bras did establish the requisite elements for Article III
standing.
In Northeastern, the Supreme Court held that a party attempting to
demonstrate an "injury in fact" must first allege that he or she is "ready
and able to bid on contracts."13 7 Although Bras could not literally allege
that he was "ready and able" to bid on a current or future Pacific Bell
contract, his firm's exclusion at an earlier stage in Pacific Bell's contracting process created this disability. 138 In other words, Bras was unable
to make this precise allegation because Pacific Bell's "prequalification criteria" form, which evaluated Bras's status as a nonminority, excluded Bras
from even reaching the list of firms that were entitled to bid on the utility's
any, would be traceable to the contracting process of a utility."). Thus, Judge
Pregerson stated that, as in Allen, the "'links in the chain of causation between the
challenged Government conduct and the asserted injury are far too weak"' for Bras
to have standing. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 759).
Upon determining that Bras could only trace his injury to Pacific Bell, Pregerson
stated that Bras's injury would not necessarily be redressed if the court struck down
the Law and the Order. Id. (Pregerson,J., dissenting) (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976)). For this reason, Judge Pregerson
contended that the requisite element of redressability was absent. Id. (Pregerson,

J., dissenting).
Earlier in his dissent, Judge Pregerson also discussed Bras's settlement with
Pacific Bell. Id. at 878 (Pregerson,J., dissenting). He suggested that if Bras sought
to challenge a race- or gender-based program at all, he should sue the party that
developed the program. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Thus, Judge Pregerson
said, the party for Bras to sue was Pacific Bell. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting).

Judge Pregerson, however, argued that Bras's suit against the Commission was
meritless as challenging provisions that mandate goals alone because Bras had settied with Pacific Bell and the utility was no longer a defendant. Id. (Pregerson,J.,
dissenting).
135. Bras, 59 F.3d at 875-76. For a discussion of the Bras court's holding, see
supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
136. Bras,59 F.3d at 876-79 (Pregerson,J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
dissent's reasoning, see supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
137. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City ofJacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993); see also O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's grant of
standing because plaintiff alleged that company was "ready, willing, and able" to
perform construction work).
138. Bras, 59 F.3d at 873 (noting that "Bras cannot presently 'bid' on future
projects ... because Pacific Bell has entered into long-term business relationships
with three architects that are now used for all of its architectural service needs").
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contracts. 139 In addition, Bras's next opportunity to seek Pacific Bell's
consideration would not arise for three years because of the long-term
nature of the utility's contracts. 140 The Bras court, therefore, recognized
that the facts of this case prevented Bras from making an exact replication
of the allegations in Northeastern and determined that such a distinction
should not change the overall "injury in fact" analysis.14 1 Thus, it properly
found that Bras satisfied the requirements of both Northeasternand Ninth
Circuit precedent when Bras alleged that he was "'ready, willing and able
to provide [architectural] services"' in the future, if given the
142
opportunity.
139. See id. at 874 (stating that "Bras would have been one of the three firms
considered for work by Pacific Bell" but for Pacific Bell's "prequalification criteria"
form).
140. Id. at 873 (noting that Pacific Bell had entered into three contractual
agreements with architects to supply all of Pacific Bell's architectural service
needs).
141. Id. ("That Bras can only compete for long-term contracts every several
years rather than on a project-by-project basis does not change the [standing] analysis."). For a discussion of the facts in Northeastern, see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
142. Bras, 59 F.3d at 874 (quoting Bras's summary judgment declaration)
(emphasis omitted); see Northeastern,508 U.S. at 666 ("[A] party challenging a setaside program ... need only demonstrate that it is able and ready to bid on contracts .... "); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Coalition For Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d
1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991). In Associated Genera4 the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the plaintiff association had standing to challenge a San Francisco ordinance because the plaintiffs intended to bid for city contracts and the application of the
challenged ordinance to such bids was mandatory. Id. at 1407 (citing Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 929-30 (9th Cir. 1991)). Equally important,
the court provided a summary of when the Supreme Court has found "injury in
fact" to be lacking. Id. The court stated that in all claims in which the Court
determined that the plaintiff's injury was "too speculative" for standing, either the
plaintiffs did not establish that they had "firm intentions to take action that would
trigger the challenged governmental action," or the plaintiffs did not demonstrate
that "even if [they] did take such action, they would be subjected to the challenged
governmental action." Id.
Bras's allegations were not similar to those claims identified by the Associated
General court as lacking an actual injury. Rather, Bras demonstrated that he did
have firm intentions to seek Pacific Bell's business in the future. Bras, 59 F.3d at
874 ("'I earnestly desire to reinstate my long term business relationship with Pacific
Bell . . . in the future ....
'" (quoting Bras's summary judgment declaration)).
Moreover, if Bras did seek Pacific Bell's business, the application of the challenged
provisions to the competition would be compulsory. See id. at 872 (citing CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE § 8283(a) (West 1994)) (noting requirements of Law and Order that
would apply to Pacific Bell as telephone corporation with gross annual revenues
exceeding $25 million); see also Appellant's Opening Brief at 22, Bras v. California
Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The same [Law] is presently in
effect. The same General Order of the [Commission] mandates compliance by
the individual utilities."). Therefore, Bras's injury is more substantial than those
claims in which the Supreme Court found that the injury was too speculative. See,
e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 516 (finding that plaintiff never indicated that it
engaged in any specific project that was precluded or delayed by challenged governmental action).
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In his dissent, Judge Pregerson refused to look beyond the literal language of Northeastern. Judge Pregerson noted that there were no current
Pacific Bell projects on which Bras could bid. 143 Relying upon this fact,
Judge Pregerson then asserted that Bras lacked an injury and could not
demonstrate the possibility of future harm.'" The Supreme Court's opinion in Northeastern, however, does not support such an inflexible application of the facts to the injury analysis. 145
Furthermore, Judge Pregerson's approach would deny Bras standing
simply because the particular contract that Bras sought had a screening
process and was long-term in nature. This position ignores the fact that
the screening process, Pacific Bell's "prequalification criteria" form, is the
stage where Bras alleged that his firm was unable to compete on an equal
basis. 146 Moreover, Judge Pregerson's approach does not give effect to
evidence in the record that Bras could, if given the opportunity, compete
14 7
for future projects with Pacific Bell.
To satisfy the NortheasternCourt's "injury in fact" standing analysis, the
court examined whether Bras had identified a "discriminatory policy" that
143. Bras, 59 F.3d at 876 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (noting that Bras's first
eligibility would arise in three years).
144. Id. at 877 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson disregarded
Bras's allegation that he intended to seek future business with Pacific Bell because
his statement was made after he settled with Pacific Bell. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson's position presumes that Bras cannot make such an allegation after a settlement. Yet, the simple fact of settlement with Pacific Bell, absent
other evidence, does not lead to an inference that Bras can no longer attempt to

provide services for the utility. Appellant's Reply Brief at 8, Bras (No. 93-15764).
145. For a discussion of authorities contending that the Northeastern Court
took a broad approach to standing and liberalized the "injury in fact" requirement,
see supra note 73. Judge Pregerson treated the Northeastern case as if the Court
limited the holding to its specific facts or that the opinion was later restricted to
challenges to state or local laws. Yet, in more recent standing determinations,
courts have applied Northeastern favorably in different factual settings. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (1995) (citing Northeastern, 508
U.S. at 667) (applying "injury in fact" rule of Northeastern in constitutional challenge to federal government affirmative action program); see also Hopwood v.
Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 567-68 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (stating that Northeastern'sstanding analysis is not limited in application to challenges to express set-asides or racial
reservations; rather, Northeastern "injury in fact" analysis applies to "any government barrier that either created a discriminatory obstacle or had the effect of producing unequal access to a government benefit"), rev'd on other grounds,78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
146. See Bras, 59 F.3d at 871 (describing Bras's exclusion from further business relations with Pacific Bell and his claim that exclusion resulted from implementation of Law and Order).
147. See id. at 874 (providing evidence that Bras will seek future business with
Pacific Bell). Bras declared that he would re-establish his business relationship
with Pacific Bell if given the chance. Id. Moreover, Bras offered evidence from
which the court could conclude that there would be future competitions for Pacific Bell's business in which Bras would be eligible to participate. Id. The court
also noted that the Commission did not offer any evidence that Bras's settlement
with Pacific Bell prevented him from seeking future business with the utility. Id.
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prevented his firm from competing on an equal basis. 148 First, however,
the majority confronted the Commission's argument that the Law and the
Order could not be deemed "discriminatory" because the explicit language of the provisions only established "goals." 149 In his dissent, Judge
Pregerson accepted this contention.1 50 The majority properly stated, how15
ever, that a law cannot escape judicial scrutiny by its language alone. '
Instead, the court discussed precedent that also had concluded that a label given to a minority participation program, such as "goals," does not
alter the standing analysis. 152 Therefore, the court properly examined the
148. Id. at 874-75 (examining whether Law and Order "contain any race or
gender specific discriminatory devices, such as preferences or set-asides pursuant
to which Bras could be denied equal treatment").
149. Id. For the pertinent language of the Law and the Order, see supra note
85.
150. Bras, 59 F.3d at 877-88 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Judge Pregerson argued that the NortheasternCourt rendered its standing decision solely because the
challenged ordinance in that case contained a set-aside program. Id. (Pregerson,
J., dissenting) (citing Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 666). Therefore, Judge Pregerson
concluded that Northeasterndoes not apply to Bras's situation because the Law and
the Order did not contain an explicit set-aside. Id. at 878 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Judge Pregerson failed to recognize that the challenged program in Northeastern did not actually call its program a set-aside. Northeastern,508
U.S. at 661. Instead, the program purported to establish "participation goals" and
a "Sheltered Market Plan." Id. The Court, however, found the descriptions immaterial, looked beyond the terminology, evaluated these methods and concluded
that they had the effect of establishing a set-aside. Id. at 662 (determining that
"Sheltered Market Plan is a 'set aside' by another name .. .[that] disadvantages

[the plaintiff] in the same fundamental way" as express set-aside). Therefore, the
Bras court also has the ability to disregard the labels of the provisions at issue,
ascertain their practical effect, determine that they implicitly establish a set-aside
or racial preference and apply the Northeasternanalysis. For further discussion of
the Supreme Court's rejection of reliance upon the description or label of an allegedly race-conscious program when evaluating the program, see infra note 151.
151. Bras, 59 F.3d at 874 ("The [Law and Order] are not immunized from
scrutiny because they purport to establish 'goals' rather than 'quotas."'). In reaching its decision to grant standing, the NortheasternCourt relied heavily upon Regents
of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Northeastern,508 U.S. at 665.

In Bakke, the Court noted that the parties were in disagreement over what to call
the challenged special admissions program. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288 (opinion of
Powell, J.). The plaintiff referred to it as a "racial quota," whereas the defendant
called it a "goal of minority representation." Id. (opinion of Powell, J.). The Court
stated, however, that debates over the labels of programs are irrevelant. Id. at 289
(opinion of Powell, J.) ("This semantic distinction is beside the point."). Instead,
the Court chose to examine what the program actually did, regardless of its label.
Id. (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Whether this limitation is described as a quota or goal,
it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status.").
152. Bras, 59 F.3d at 874-75 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097, 2105 (1995) (finding standing to challenge federal program that established "goal" for participation of "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals"); Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 661-62 (granting standing to challenge ordinance
that established "participation goals"); Concrete Works of Colo.v. Denver, 36 F.3d
1513, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1315 (1995) (concluding that
nonminority contractor had standing to challenge ordinance that created minority
participation "goals"); Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors v. Cuomo, 981
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"economic realities" or "practical effect" of the challenged provisions and
did not simply accept the labels that the California Legislature and Public
1 55
Utilities Commission had given the provisions.
In determining that the provisions constituted a discriminatory policy, the majority also correctly found that the standing elements of causation and redressability were present.' 54 Although the Order claimed to
establish only "goals," it also gave the Commission the ability to monitor
the "progress" of a utility's minority participation program and issue an
economic sanction if that progress was not acceptable.' 5 5 Moreover, a
main objective of the Law was to "ensure" that a "proportion" of a reguF.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing standing of nonminority contractor to
challenge state statute that required contractors to comply with "disadvantaged
enterprise goals")). Additional circuit court precedent, not cited in the Brasopinion, also supports the majority's conclusion. See Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phila.,
6 F.3d 990, 993, 995 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming grant of standing to associations
challenging city ordinance that establishes "goals" for participation of "disadvantaged business enterprises"); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963
F.2d 420, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (granting standing to construction firm to challenge District of Columbia's Minority Contracting Act, which allocated contracts to
reach set "goal"). The District of Columbia's failed argument in O'Donnell is very
similar to the Commission's position in Bras. In O'Donnell the D.C. Circuit addressed the District of Columbia's contention that the court could not scrutinize
its Minority Contracting Act ("Act") because the Act only established "goals" and
did not create explicit quotas. O'Donnell 963 F.2d at 423. Yet the D.C. Circuit
agreed with the district court and "placed no importance on this difference in
terminology." Id. (citing ContractorsAss'n, 945 F.2d at 1270-71) (Higginbotham,J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
153. See Bras, 59 F.3d at 874 (stating that court must "look to the economic
realities of the program rather than the label attached to it"); see also Concrete Works,

36 F.3d at 1519 n.6; Domar Elec., Inc. v. City of LA., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822, 833
(1995) (stating that Bras held that focus of equal protection analysis is "practical
effect," instead of label, of race-conscious program). In Concrete Works, the court
admitted that the challenged Denver ordinance was different from the ordinance
that was challenged in Northeasternbecause the Denver ordinance only established
goals and lacked an inflexible set-aside. Concrete Works, 36 F.3d at 1517, 1519 n.6.
The court, however, found this distinction irrelevant and stated: "what is dispositive for.., standing analysis" is an examination of whether the ordinance "makes it
more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members
of another." Id. at 1519 n.6 (citing Northeastern, 508 U.S. at 666).
Some commentators agree that reliance upon the label of affirmative action
programs can be misleading and that, in real practice, "goals" may often have the
same effect as quotas. See ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
CoNrRoEmSY: A MORAL

AND LEGAL

ANALYsis 162-63 (1980) (arguing that "hiring

goals" can just as easily lead to racially preferential hiring as explicit quotas can);
UROFSKY, supra note 3, at 26 ("It is all too easy to go from saying, 'We should have
10 percent blacks... and that is the goal we should work toward.. .' to saying,
'The next thirty people we hire must be black ...so we meet our quota.').
154. Bras, 59 F.3d at 875 ("[T]his argument implicates not only the 'injury in
fact' requirement but also the interrelated requirements that there be a casual
relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct and that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.").
155. General Order 156 of the Public Utilities Commission of the State of
California §§ 8.12, 9.1.4 (1988) (allowing Commission to impose "penalty" on utility after investigation, and requiring utilities to provide description of "progress" in
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lated utility's contracts go to minority business enterprises. 156 Therefore,
the majority properly found that these provisions were discriminatory because they used race to reserve a certain percentage of a utility's contracts. 15 7 In light of the foregoing, the court correctly concluded that the
enforceable, race-conscious reservation of the provisions provided the
causal link between the Commission's conduct and Bras's inability to compete equally because of his race. 1 58
Finally, the dissent's contention that the majority's decision is irreconcilable with Allen and Simon lacks merit. 159 In both decisions, the causal
connection between the challenged government conduct and the plaintiff's injury was too attenuated because the plaintiff's injury was highly related to actions of independent, third parties who were not before the
Court. 160 In contrast, the third party involved in Bras's injury, Pacific Bell,
can hardly be considered independent. Rather, the utility is regulated
and monitored by a party that was before the court: the Commission. 16 1
Furthermore, unlike the IRS in both Allen and Simon, the Commission in
meeting goals and explanation of why particular utility may have fallen short of
goals).
156. Appellant's Opening Brief at 26, Bras v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-15764) (citing CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8281(a)
(West 1994)) (stating that Law's purpose was "'to ensure that a fair proportion of
the total purchases and contracts ... for commodities, supplies, technology, property, and services for regulated utilities are awarded to ... minority.., business
enterprises"').
157. Bras, 59 F.3d at 875 (stating that Law and Order have "the practical effect" of requiring public utilities to adopt discriminatory programs such as bidding
preferences or set-asides).
158. Id. (concluding that Law and Order "effectively encourage, if not compel, Pacific Bell to adopt discriminatory programs"). The court did not expressly
address whether Bras satisfied the redressability element. Yet, this absence does
not suggest that the court simply failed to consider the requirement of redressability. Rather, the analysis for causation and redressability is the same when a
party seeks to enjoin unconstitutional conduct, as Bras did. TRIBE, supra note 5,
§ 3-18, at 130 n.6; cf Choundas, supra note 29, at 1130-31 (indicating that courts
often collapse causation and redressability into one analysis).
159. Bras, 59 F.3d at 879 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citing Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 758-59 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
42-43 (1976)). For a discussion of Allen, see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Simon, see supra notes 37, 39-46 and accompanying text.
160. Allen, 468 U.S. at 757-59 (stating that chain of causation is too weak for
standing because independent decisions of numerous third parties, such as officials and parents of children at racially discriminatory schools, may greatly influence plaintiffs injury); Simon, 426 U.S. at 42-43 (indicating that it is "purely
speculative" whether plaintiffs' injury, denial of medical services, is traceable to
defendant, IRS or decisions made by third-party hospitals).
161. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871-72 (noting that Commission regulates utilities and
oversees their minority business procurement plans). For this reason, the Commission has direct regulatory control over Pacific Bell's specific minority procurement efforts. See id. In contrast, the IRS defendant in both Allen and Simon had no
such control over the respective actions at issue in those cases-segregated schools
in Allen and inadequate medical services at hospitals in Simon. Allen, 468 U.S. at
739; Simon, 426 U.S. at 28.
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Bras is allegedly the source of the discriminatory program. 162 For these
reasons, Judge Pregerson's reasoning fails. Indeed, if the court did accept
the dissent's argument, it would allow the Commission to institute a raceconscious program and insulate its acts from judicial scrutiny by forcing its
1 63
regulated utilities to implement the program.
VI.

IMPACT

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Bras represents sound Article III
standing analysis and application of precedent in the context of a claim
that implicates a controversial topic of the law-affirmative action. 16 4 In
the past, many legal scholars have criticized restrictive standing analyses as
a means of excluding claims that are disfavored or controversial on the
merits. 165 Yet the Bras court achieved greater consistency within standing
162. Bras, 59 F.3d at 871 (alleging that Commission's implementation of Law
and Order violates Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). In both
Allen and Simon, the plaintiffs did not allege that certain actions of the IRS directly
discriminated against them. Instead, the plaintiffs only maintained that the IRS's
favorable tax treatment of a third party encouraged the third party to continue to
discriminate against them. Allen, 468 U.S. at 744-46 (stating that plaintiffs alleged

that IRS grant of tax exemption to racially discriminatory schools encouraged expansion of segregated education); Simon, 426 U.S. at 33 (describing allegation that
IRS extension of tax benefits to hospitals encouraged hospitals to discriminate
against indigent plaintiffs). Allen and Simon are therefore distinguishable from
Bras's case.

163. SeeJulie Nakashima, Equal Opportunityfor Whom?, CAL. REAL EST. J., Aug.
1995, at 14, 30 (statement of Pamela A. Lewis, attorney for J. Jack Bras) ("(I]f
settling with the utility meant you couldn't get to the originator of the program,
then the [Commission] would be insulated from [constitutional scrutiny] ....
[W]ithout knocking down the relevant code provisions and general order, it would
give the [Commission] leave to force utilities to keep their [race-conscious]
programs.").
164. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's Article III standing analysis, see
supra notes 23-79 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., HowARD FINK & MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY
AND PRACTICE 321 (2d ed. 1987) (suggesting that "Court restricts standing where
the public would disapprove of a conservative result on the merits, and allows it
where the public would accept such a result"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONsTrruTIONAL CHOICES 100 (1985) (criticizing Court's denial of standing for those claims
that Court's substantive doctrines would require it to accept on merits); Gene R.
Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 658
(1985) (criticizing Allen as restrictive standing decision that disguises Court's disfavor of presented claim); Spann, supra note 73, at 1423 (claiming that Supreme
Court developed stringent standing requirements "so that it could defer to the
political process for the resolution of contentious social issues"); Mark V. Tushnet,
The New Law of Standing: A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 663-64 &
n.5-6 (1977) (citing Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)) (stating that Court denies standing "when the claim would be rejected were the merits reached"); Gottlieb, supra note 21, at 1143 (contending that constitutional standing decisions are
attempts to avoid controversial issues and are typically decisions on merits); cf
Winter, supra note 21, at 1373 n.14 (suggesting that "most academics and practicing lawyers at least share the suspicion that standing law is nothing more than a
manipulation by the Court to decide cases while not appearing to decide their
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doctrine by basing its conclusion to grant standing on the most relevant
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. 16 6 In contrast, the dissent's
specific reliance on the explicit language of the challenged provisions and
its unwillingness to recognize their race-conscious mandates can only be
explained as Judge Pregerson's desire to prevent judicial review of an af167
firmative action program.
As the law currently stands, all race-based affirmative action pro68
grams-federal, state or local-are subject to strict scrutiny review.'
Although the Bras court did not examine the merits of Bras's discrimination claim, 169 the case has two major implications for future challenges to
government-sponsored, racial affirmative action. First, Bras affirms the
proposition that plaintiffs bringing equal protection challenges against
such affirmative action programs need only satisfy the more lenient requirements for standing, as identified by the Supreme Court in Northeastern 17 ° Second, and equally important, the Bras decision sends a clear
message to other governmental bodies implementing minority participation programs. Namely, they may not evade constitutional strict scrutiny

merits"). A formerJustice of the United States Supreme Court has also suggested
that the Court employs standing analysis to reject disfavored constitutional claims.
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that Court's restrictive
standing decision in Warth "can be explained only by an indefensible hostility to
the claim on the merits"). But see Floyd, supra note 20, at 919-20 (asserting that
"[i]f the Court were truly hostile to certain assertions of right, one would expect it
to reach out to seize and dispose of such claims on the merits, rather than to
temporize on [standing] grounds").
166. For an analysis of the court's reasoning in Bras, see supra notes 135-42,
148-49, 151-58 and accompanying text.
167. For an analysis of the dissent's rationale in Bras, see supra notes 143-47,
150, 159-63 and accompanying text. Notably, although a decision was not rendered on the merits in Bras, both parties contested the constitutionality of the
provisions in their briefs before the Ninth Circuit. See Appellant's Opening Brief
at 23-31, Bras v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 59 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1995) (No.
93-15764); Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 19-25, Bras (No. 93-15764). Therefore,
the judges were well aware of the significant substantive issues at stake in the case.
168. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995)
(holding that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor" are subject to strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. JA. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (striking down local affirmative action program
for failure to satisfy strict scrutiny review). For a discussion of the Adarand deci-

sion, see supra note 79. For a discussion of the Croson opinion and its impact, see
supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
169. Bras, 59 F.3d at 875 ("We express no opinion as to whether the [Law] or
Order discriminates against Bras on the basis of race or gender.").
170. Id. at 873 (citing Northeastern Ha. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993)). For further discussion of the
Northeastern "injury in fact" analysis for standing, see supra notes 60-79 and accom-

panying text.
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by couching a racial affirmative action program in a benign term such as
"goals" if the "economic reality" of the program is racial preference.1 71
DavidJ. Antczak

171. See Nakashima, supra note 163, at 30 (statement of Pamela A. Lewis, attorney for J. Jack Bras) ("This was just a standing case, but .... [Bras] sends a

beacon light to all governmental bodies who seek to evade constitutional scrutiny
of their programs by using the buzzword 'goal' for its numerical quotas."); Reynolds Holding, Affirmative Action Goals Open to Suit: Appeals Court Allows Chalenge to
State Plan, S.F. CHRON., July 6, 1995, at All ("The decision ... means that state
programs designed merely to encourage the hiring of minorities and women without quotas may still be vulnerable to legal challenges."). For a discussion of the
Bras court's "economic realities" analysis for standing, see supranotes 120, 153 and
accompanying text.
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